MARINE CORPS
Gazette

SEPTEMBER, 1946 30c



MARINES IN THE PACIFIC WAR • WHAT GOOD IS A PISTOL?
THE MARINE CORPS FOURTH ESTATE • THE FRENCH ARSENAL

THIS MONTH'S COVER

TO lead off Fletcher Pratt's new book on the Marines in the Pacific war, Sgt John De Grasse visualizes the Wellington, New Zealand, docks when the 1st Marine Division loaded out for the Solomons back in July 1942. This is the third consecutive month that the GAZETTE cover has been by *Leatherneck* staff artist De Grasse.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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ORGAN OF THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION
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

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

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

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

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by Capt Andrew R. Bergstrom
Capt Earl J. Wilson
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PASSING
BOOKS OF INTEREST

Pacific War in Pictures . . .

YOUR MARINE CORPS IN WORLD WAR II—Capt Andrew R. Bergstrom, Capt Earl J. Wilson, Sgt Frank Sisk, USMCR. 200 pages of photographs, 12,000 words of text. Atlanta, Ga.: Albert Love Enterprises. $4.00.

Here is your chance to keep World War II in the living room in the years ahead, when Junior no longer asks about your combat days with the 1st Provisional Snowshoe Platoon. *Your Marine Corps in World War II* is a big book of pictures, starting with Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 and ending with the Marine detachment aboard the *USS Missouri* at parade rest the day the Japs signed the papers. In between are some 300 photographs selected from the Marine Corps files. They convey more reality about the Marines' war in the Pacific than any number of beachhead stories ever could.

Photos of each campaign are grouped in a separate section, headed by maps and a 1500-word digest of the action. The book leads off with a portrait of the Commandant and his message to all marines of the recent war. A two-page introduction gives a background of Marine Corps history up to the summer of 1942. Also included, as a section of the book, is an illustrated history of the Women's Reserve.

The editors, Capts Bergstrom and Wilson and Sgt Sisk, declare that their book is for the Marine veteran, "to give him a solid foundation on which to re-enact the scenes of that time of his life when he was a proud member of the Marine Corps, fighting the enemies of his country in one of the worst wars in the history of mankind." They have succeeded in their purpose, for their picture selection includes most of the well-known shots by Marine combat photographers. Resembling a high school yearbook in format and layout, the volume is large and the pictures are printed with a fine screen on glossy paper. The cover is dark red leatherette, embossed with the Corps insignia in gold. It is a book that is good to look at, in every sense.

For the most part the photographs have no captions and are identified only by the section in which they appear. This is in line with the editors' theory that the marine is his own best historian and will sit down and tell people about the pictures as he turns the pages. This he can and will do, no doubt, regarding the campaigns in which he participated. But for other islands or air operations or WR activities there is little he can say to clarify the pictures—and some of them need explanation. There are some cap-

IN REVIEW
TO MARINE READERS

tions in the book, seemingly added at random. General interest probably would increase if all the photos had short captions, specifying the island and activity depicted.

Trying to cover a war in one volume is bound to lead to errors; this book has its share in the written digests of the campaigns. Some of them are a little startling, even in a hasty round-up of facts on the action. Samples: dating the Solomons landings on 7 July 1942; a map of Kwajalein Atoll which omits Roi-Namur and the Marine zone of action; referring to Roi-Namur as "comprising Kwajalein Atoll"; saying that the Japs on Saipan "had fled to the northern tip of the island" nine days after the landing; describing the first-night counterattack at Tinian as "infiltration"; the unqualified statement that nothing in Marine history compares to the battle of Iwo Jima, and attributing to LtGen H. M. Smith the classic remark about uncommon valor at Iwo.

None of these can detract from the photographs, however, and the pictures are the book. As the editors say (in *A Tribute* abounding in typographical errors) the combat photographers were aware of the combined suffering and humor of battle. They captured both aspects in the pictures reproduced in these pages. The camera may not stimulate our children to "provide a bulwark against a repetition of such widespread horror," as the editors hope. But it certainly will cause a lot of reminiscing every time a few marines get together with this book. LM

Polish Uprising . . .

SILENT IS THE VISTULA—The Story of the Warsaw Uprising—Irena Orska (translated from the Polish by Marta Erdman). 275 pages. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. $3.00.

This is a factual, emotional account of street fighting as it was waged in Warsaw for 63 days in the summer of 1944 by a woman officer in the Polish Home Army who was on the barricades for a month until her sector was overrun by the Nazis and she was captured.

Without the expected Russian assistance the Home Army faced a bloody, hopeless task—wresting their city from Nazi control after five years of occupation. Against the Tiger tanks, planes, mortars, and machine guns of the Nazi troops was an array of men, women, and children with too few small arms and improvised grenades. Somes antitank weapons were dropped by Polish fliers based in Italy but for the most

SILENT
IS THE VISTULA

by Irena Orska

—The story of the Warsaw uprising. An account of the bitter street fighting that took place for 63 days in war-torn Warsaw during the summer of 1944. Written by a woman officer of the Polish Home Army who was in the fighting for a month before being captured.

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PASSING IN REVIEW

Continued

part the Poles lacked everything but the spirit marked by the red and white armband. That spirit kept the battle flaming for weeks.

Scattered through the Underground were officers and men of the defeated Polish Army who had been waiting since 1939 for another shot at the invaders. These were men like Sgt Putkowski who had kept his uniform packed in moth flakes and his heavy machine gun and ammunition walled up in the cellar under his grocery store. On 1 August when the Uprising began, the sergeant and his crew tore down the wall, assembled their gun, and for weeks kept it working against the Germans garrisoned in the University.

Marine readers (who may have been busy in the rubble of Garapan or Agana that summer when Warsaw was falling) will find *Silent Is The Vistula* a graphic account of a tragic episode of World War II. They will recognize the courage of a fighting people—as even the Nazi officers found themselves saluting one of their prisoners, an 8-year-old girl who had won Poland's highest decoration during the Uprising. LM

Chinese Youth . . .

IT IS DARK UNDERGROUND — Loo Pin-Fei. 200 pages. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. $2.75.

It is Dark Underground attempts to tell in a melodramatic way the story of a group of young Chinese boys and girls, many of them 12 to 14 years of age, who waged an unheralded but effective underground campaign of destruction against the Japanese aggressor in China during the war.

Led by the author, a member of China's Student Army, the group consisted largely of high school students whose youth gave them a mark of innocence in conducting their nightly forays against Japanese supply depots, theaters, dance halls, and other points of concentration. Their trickery and extreme bravery earned for them the name of "Fire Gods" by the Japanese whose extensive efforts to eliminate them were never quite successful.

In tracing the activities of the group from its inception to its heyday just prior to the end of the war, the author gives a simple but complete narrative of each of the series of movements centered primarily around the cities of Tientsin, Peiping, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Sochaw. Replacements for the organization were trained in Free China and moved into the occupied areas as their missions became more daring and far-reaching. OKL

THE MARINE CORPS
THE PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE
FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

Gazette

SEPTEMBER 1946

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Picture credits: All pictures official Army, Navy, or Marine photos unless otherwise credited.

MAJ JOHN D. COOPER got his first pistol at the age of 12 and has been a bug on firearms and hunting ever since. He has two national first prizes for big game. A native Californian, he graduated from Stanford U and entered the Marine Corps via the 1941 Basic School. From March '42 to September '44—from Attu until Guam that is—he skippered the Marine detachment aboard the *USS Pennsylvania*. After that he was stationed at TC, Camp Pendleton, where he trained troops in basic weapons among other things. Attended the 9th Command and Staff class and at present is an intelligence instructor in the Amphibious Warfare School, MCS, Quantico. His *What Good is a Pistol?* is on page 29.

CAPT PHILLIP N. PIERCE was once a reporter and news commentator in Bangor and Augusta, Maine. His war years, however, were spent with the field artillery, mostly with the 14th Marines. He is now back in the journalistic fold, being the OinC of the News Section, Division of Public Information, HQMC. A graduate in journalism from the University of Maine, he enlisted in the Corps on 12 March 1942 and was commissioned a second lieutenant on 22 August 1942. He has three operations behind him—Roi-Namur, Saipan-Tinian, and Iwo Jima—and has the Bronze Star and the Commendation Ribbon. For a roundup of PIO activities in World War II, see *The Marine Corps' Fourth Estate* on page 48.



Southwest Pacific Area - Summer - 1942

14 June—MajGen Vandegrift arrives with his headquarters staff at Wellington.
26 June—ViceAdm Ghormley confers with MajGen Vandegrift at Auckland.
18 July—RearAdm Turner, CO of attacking forces, okays Marine operation plan.
22 July—Transports, combat loaded with the 1st Marine Division, sail from Wellington.
28 July—Task force rendezvous at Koro in the Fijis for final landing rehearsals.

Author's Note . . .

The present writer believes it extremely important to consider two elements to which comparatively little consideration is given in writing history, and particularly, in writing military history. These two elements are the state of information of the officers who arrive at command decision and their state of mind. The information commanders have is usually inaccurate—in fact, it is usually so inaccurate, that one may set it down as a general statement that the information upon which commanders act is largely wrong, at least with regard to details. Their state of mind is also very important; it determines what action they decide to take on the basis of the usually inaccurate information they possess.

The command decisions are the result of the interplay of these factors. The result of actions in the field arises from the command decisions on both sides, plus the indoctrination and training of the troops on both sides. But it seems to me very important to emphasize what information commanders had at the moments they took action, and what their general views of the situation were at that time. Too often, military history and military criticism are written in the light of hindsight, and commanders are treated as though they were in possession of everything we now know, as well as the calm of mind which comes from considering events long after they are ended.

I have therefore made an effort to report, in this manuscript, the operations of the Marines in amphibious warfare, as they looked to the men in the place and at the time. At the same time, since war is always a double story, every effort has been made similarly to report the Japanese reaction, the basis upon which they formed their command decisions, and on which they acted, at the time.

THE Marines IN THE Pacific War

Chapter 1

GUADALCANAL: THE PLANNING STAGE

By Fletcher Pratt

THE plan was designated as "Lone Wolf." It called for the 1st Marine Division to be assembled in New Zealand and there to undergo a period of intensive training in amphibious war, looking toward employment in action about January 1, 1943. Behind "Lone Wolf" lay the easily-reached decision at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level that in this war the Marines would be used exclusively in the Pacific.

During the twenty-year peace, when so much of the theory of our military establishment was worked out, the reasons for the existence of the Corps had come under consideration. It was clear that the Marines could be justified neither as small arms men aboard warships nor as elite storm-troop infantry, their employment in World War I. There had accordingly been a steady orientation of Marine thought and training toward specialization for beachhead work. A statement of naval policy in the middle twenties places the Fleet Marine Force highest among the functions of the Corps—in the sense of service afloat with interludes of landing on what amounted to police duty. A similar statement of 1940 mentions prominently, and indeed almost exclusively, the far more serious task of winning beachheads under the guns of the Navy and holding them till the arrival of the Army. The area where the Pacific war was being fought consists largely of beachheads beyond which there is so little territory that once they were gained there would be no use for the Army men. It was the obvious theatre for Marine activity; but they were primarily an offensive outfit and in those early months of the war it seemed altogether unlikely that we would have the naval means of conducting an offensive anywhere before the turn of the year.

Hence "Lone Wolf," and hence MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding the division,

Introducing the Author . . .

Fletcher Pratt

SOME MONTHS ago the sergeant who does such things put a neatly inked "Fletcher Pratt" on the door of the office just down the hall from the editorial offices of the GAZETTE. *That was the first indication we had that the little man with the square cut beard and plaid shirt, undoubtedly one of the best informed and most popular writers on naval and military subjects, was going to do a history of the Marines in World War II.*

Working at the Marine Corps Schools under the sanction of Headquarters, he has ready access not only to the official records but also to many of the men who played key parts in the Marine campaigning across the Pacific. He prefers working from personal contacts rather than written records. The lifelike quality of his naval histories is largely due to the fact that they are written mostly from the results of interviews with personnel—if writing about ships or battles—and with associates if writing about a man. He has a knack for separating the sea stories from the facts and careful research is one of the most important parts of his work.

Currently he is working here alternate weeks—spends a week gathering material and then retreats, presumably to his New York apartment on West 58th Street, to get it down in writing, although he admits that too many visitors and phone callers sometimes drive him into the greater seclusion of his club or other unrevealed refuges when really concentrated effort is required. When working he shows a predilection not only for bright-hued plaid shirts and contrasting ties but also for slacks and sport jackets of indeterminate origins and quantities of pencil-thin cigars. His grey-flecked, ginger colored beard is nearly as well known as Monte Woolley's or Rex Stout's.

Fletcher Pratt was born, not on salt water as some might imagine, but at Buffalo, N. Y., on 25 April 1897, the son of Robert and Alice Pratt. He attended Hobart College briefly in 1915-1916, then became a librarian, serving with the War Library Service during World War I. From 1920 until 1923 he worked as a reporter and then decided to free lance, specializing on military subjects, because the slick magazines weren't buying and the military journals, then as now, were crying for material. He took two years out in 1931-1933 to study at the University of Paris.

Perhaps it was in Paris that he added an interest in cooking to his fondness for good food. He has written a cook book which is now in the process of being published.

He raises marmosets and at present has 14, most of them named after friends. His success in raising them he attributes to sweet cod liver oil pills which the monkeys think are candy. He is married to the former Inga Stephens, a fashion artist who is pretty and young.

His forte is history but he is in the process of writing a novel. He is also working—being a writer who can tackle concurrently a great many projects—on a Napoleonic series, two books of which have been published, "Road to Empire" and "Empire and the Sea," the last being released this past winter. Two other books which were also released this year are "Night Work" and "Fleet Against Japan."

His "The Marines in the Pacific War" is tentatively scheduled for publication in May of next year, by which time GAZETTE *readers will already be in possession of eight important and interesting installments. "The Marines in the Pacific War" incidentally is the* GAZETTE*'s title, not Mr. Pratt. He no longer bothers to title his books as his publisher invariably retitles them anyway.*

Fletcher Pratt is a member of the U.S. Naval Institute, a Republican, and a Christian Scientist. He invented the Naval War Game which is played literally all over the world—much of his correspondence is from people discussing the game or desiring advice on argumentive points. Twice before he has written for the GAZETTE: *"The War at Sea" in July '44 and "The Jap Hope: Fortress East" in November '44.*

arrived at Wellington, New Zealand, on June 14, 1942, with his new headquarters staff to set up housekeeping and the prospects of six months' intensive training ahead. The time was needed. In the first place the division was full of new enlistees who were aware of the tradition that a marine is a very tough individual, but who did not quite know how to be tough themselves. They were particularly in need of physical conditioning after the long voyage out aboard transports so thoroughly loaded there was not much opportunity even for calisthenics. In the second place the organization of the division as such was still far from complete or smoothly functioning. It was the 1st Marine Division not only in designation but also in actuality, the first in Marine Corps history. There had never before been enough marines to make a division, since beachheading on the scale this war eventually demanded had not even been contemplated.

SIX months was none too much if details like this and questions like the field performance of the new Reising sub-machine gun were to be settled without the far costlier process of battle experience. For that matter there were a good many unsettled details within the organization of the division itself. Gen Vandergrift had never seen his men assembled in a single place, and many of the officers, even in the higher ranks, he did not know. Of the three combat teams into which the division was separated, only one had come with the convoy. While the divisional organization was still in progress, back in the States, one team—and that the most nearly trained—had been shipped to Samoa when there was every expectation that the Japanese drive to the southwest would carry them into that island group. The third combat team was just leaving San Francisco for New Zealand when on June 26 Gen Vandegrift was called to Auckland for an interview with ViceAdm Ghormley.

That officer was then commander of the South Pacific Area, which marched with the Southwest Pacific Area commanded by Gen MacArthur, along a line that gave Ghormley authority in New Zealand, New Caledonia, and the islands up to a somewhat ill-defined point near the equator, beyond which it did not matter since the only authority that ran was Japanese. He handed the Marine general an order from Washington; the "Lone Wolf" plan was off in favor of a new operation designated "Pestilence." It was to be an attack on the Japanese in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi region at the southern tip of the Solomons Island chain. The Japanese had occupied the area in May and were believed to be building an airfield. (This fell within the MacArthur area and the fact was to cause some bickering later until the boundaries were redrawn, but at present it did not matter.) The date would be 1 August. The forces assigned were the two available combat teams of Vandegrift's own division (Samoa to keep its allotment), a combat team of the 2d Marine Division now at San Diego; with the 1st Marine Raider Bn (now at New Caledonia) and the 3d Marine Defense Bn (now at Pearl Harbor.)

RearAdm Richmond Kelly Turner, the brilliant, dynamic (and difficult) planner would come on from Washington to be over-all commander of the attack forces; RearAdm V.A.C. Crutchley of the Australian Navy with some of his ships from the MacArthur area would lead the screening force of surface vessels. RearAdm Frank J. Fletcher, who had done so well at Coral Sea, was coming down from Pearl with three carriers as the nucleus of his support force. Simultaneously the British would make a heavy carrier strike at Timor or in that area, the MacArthur command would turn on the heat in New Guinea and there would be a raid by marines landed from submarines among the islands to the north, the whole making up a pattern of energetic simultaneous attack which should leave the Japanese in considerable confusion as to the true objective. It was America's first offensive movement in the war, the first time we would fight the enemy on our terms, not theirs.

II

GEN Vandegrift's face expressed nothing but interest and enthusiasm; the staff were no little shaken, and talking it over later, developed among themselves as the only adequate explanation why Washington had been willing to embark on so mad a project, the theory that the Japanese were about to attack the Russians in Siberia and that the Soviet had warned us to do something to distract them by August 1 or else.

The troops were incompletely equipped and scattered; so were the commanders. D Day was 37 days away and Adm Ghormley had set the concentration area at Koro in the Fijis, which meant two voyages of approximately a week each (Wellington-Koro, Koro-Solomons) and left a little over twenty days for all other processes. Out of this had to be squeezed a certain amount of time for additional training in beachhead landings. The supplies for the expedition must be embarked at once; if for no other reason, to clear the limited docking space for the second echelon, which would come in ships that must be returned to the States. But the loading of supply ships, which items went in first and came out last, depended upon the plan of operations, the tactics adopted in the face of the enemy during the crucial first hours. But the decision on these was the business of the attack force commander, Adm Turner, who would have under him both ships and troops till the latter gained a

foothold ashore and Vandegrift came into command. But Adm Turner could not arrive for weeks, nor could he discuss tactical plans while traveling.

It was a merry-go-round, in which Vandegrift and his staff had to make decisions as to operations plans without reference to the man who would be carrying them out and then seal them into irrevocability by loading the ships and arranging the brief period of training to suit one set of plans and one alone. This was not all. Plans are drawn on the basis of information and the information about the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area amounted, in a practical sense, to just about that contained in a funny story Jack London had written about the islands some 40 years before. There was a small-scale marine chart of the general area, from which even the name of Tulagi was missing; there were two oblique air photos of that island, taken some five or six years previously and there was a collection of about half a dozen postcards from bad pictures made by missionaries at indeterminate dates. The *Yorktown's* fliers had undoubtedly taken some good pictures during the May (Coral Sea) raid, but the ship had been sunk at Midway, and if the photos were still in existence, they were probably in Washington; certainly they were nowhere within range of the planners.

Information was the first need. The Division G-2, Col Frank B. Goettge, left by plane for Australia that afternoon to get more if more were to be had. G-3 Section sat down to draw a provisional plan of operations with details to be stuck in the cracks later, while G-3 himself, the much-trusted LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, flew back to Washington with the general and G-4 (LtCol Randolph M. Pate) to get things started.

The general had decided to embark his first combat team, centered on the 5th Marine Regiment, at once, in order to make room for the second echelon, whose supplies had been loaded back in the States, no one knew how or by whom, but certainly in the anticipation that there would be plenty of time to unload and reclassify.

It was the New Zealand winter and across Aotea Quay under the glaring lights there pelted almost horizontally the continual driving rain of that clime. The stores were mainly naval dry stores, which means that most of them were packed in the light cardboard boxes so convenient for use aboard ship, but which simply melt on exposure to weather in the field or on a New Zealand dock. Within 24 hours the quay was ankle-deep in toasted corn flakes and waterlogged cigarettes which the wind piled into sopping drifts. It did not matter at the moment —there are few items a marine would rather not eat than toasted corn flakes—and it had already been discovered that shipping space permitted taking supplies for only 60 days instead of the 90 demanded by Marine Corps SOP. The men already embarked upon the ships lying out in the stream were bored. It was not fun on the weather decks, so they organized black-face war dances in the hold and sang endlessly, including the new "Bless 'em All," which some had picked up in New Zealand.

III

COL Goettge did not reach Melbourne until July 1, but the results of his researches began to appear at once after that date in the form of a strong of singular individuals—ex-missionaries, planters, schooner men, and a giant with a scarred face named Mather who had been a blackbirder among the Solomons. Each had some scrap or patch of information to contribute to the gradually growing dossier on the islands and eight of the candidates revealed so much knowledge that they were made petty officers of the Australian forces and taken along as pilots.

The process presented difficulties, however. The first was that Goettge had organized his section as a one-man show with nobody beneath him but inexperienced lieutenants and in his absence these juniors were not too well aware of the process involved in extracting information from people who do not know what they ought to tell. "Certainly you can get across the Tenaru River" said the manager of the coconut plantation on Guadalcanal and it was not till an hour of relaxation over a drink some time later that he reminisced about the last time he had seen the place—"Went down there to shoot a couple of cows that couldn't get out." There were lifted eyebrows, glances passed and then a few more questions. Oh yes, the way you crossed the Tenaru was by means of the sandstrip at its mouth; up stream it was unfordable, flowing between banks eight feet high and precipitous. That little item alone meant taking along bridging equipment (since the Tenaru was in the projected line of advance) and redistributing the whole load of at least one cargo carrier to make room for it.

Volumes like the "Pacific Island Yearbook" and the British Colonial reports were consulted, but as material accumulated an evident over-all defect in information developed. It was background stuff, almost nothing about changes the Japs had made in the landscape and how many of them were there, for military purposes precisely the most important features. The Australians turned over to Col Goettge their estimate of enemy forces as drawn from the coast-watcher system* but warned that though it was fairly

*For more on Solomons Islands coast-watchers, see *Island Coastwatchers*, by Capt J. L. Zimmerman, in the Jan '46, GAZETTE.



accurate as to Tulagi and the minor islands, it could not be relied upon for Guadalcanal, where the system had run into difficulties.

As to the coast-watchers, the Australians had made the set-up at the beginning of the war in 1939 to keep tabs on German surface raiders, spies, and submarines—composing it from residents of the islands who knew the natives and were provided with radio sets. Guadalcanal had four such watchers—a lazy Frenchman, an apathetic German, a missionary who did not know how to ask the right kind of questions, and the later famous Martin Clemens, Captain in His Majesty's Solomons Island Police of the colonial service, one of the very best coast-watchers of all.

Unfortunately he had sprained his ankle badly just at this juncture and an order had gone out that he was not to broadcast for the time being—the Japs would surely put the radio locators on him and it wouldn't do to have him hopping through the jungle on a bad gam with them on his tail. "Moon" Mumma, the famous submarine skipper, offered to take his boat in and land a party to contact Clemens, but this was vetoed as risking a tipoff of the whole expedition. As next best thing to a report from Clemens two operations officers, LtCol Merrill B. Twining and Maj William B. McKean, were flown to Australia, then to Moresby where they picked up a B-17 and went out to Guadal for visual and photographic reconnaissance.

At Townsville on the way back, Twining and McKean picked up some more photos, the result of various flights over the area. The pictures were not pieced together for a long time (nobody seemed to be responsible) but from what maps could be had and from visual observation it was pretty clear that the Japs had no defenses along most of the many northern beaches of Guadalcanal. Their installations seemed to be concentrated at Lunga Point, north and slightly west of the airfield they were building, where the Lunga River flows through several mouths into the lagoon. The best estimate was that, including labor troops, they had 5,000 men on the island, a reinforced infantry regiment with an anti-aircraft battalion. There would be some 1,500 on Tulagi and Gavutu.

These facts determined the plan of operation. It called for practically simultaneous attacks on Tulagi, Gavutu, and Guadalcanal. Edson's Raider Bn, the best trained outfit in the show, would take Tulagi with an infantry battalion in support. The parachutists, also in a high degree of training, were to hit Gavutu (from boats of course, not from the air.) The remainder of the

Division would not be too many men for the bigger island and the heavier Japanese forces there. They would land at a place denominated "Beach Red," 6,000 yards east of the airfield, where the Ilu River would cover their flank against attack from the Jap positions during the delicate business of getting ashore. From the beachhead, resistance permitting them, one wing would strike along the shore toward Lunga Point, the other somewhat inland toward a great flat-topped hill called "Grassy Knoll" west of the upper course of the Lunga River which, the planters said, dominated the whole area down to and including the airfield. With speed of movement, a double envelopment might be achieved, and in any case the Japs should be swept from the area down to the mouths of the Lunga.

There were two "combat groups" in the Guadalcanal attack, under Col Leroy P. Hunt and Col Clifford B. Cates respectively.

IV

THE flight of Twining and McKean was on 17 July, but the information they brought caused no essential variation from the plan already drawn by that time. The day after this, Adm Turner arrived at Wellington, looking grim. "Where's your operation plan?" were his first words as soon as the handshakes were over. When the Marines produced one the tension relaxed notably and his own G-3 officers sat down to draw the over-all plan on the basis of Vandegrift's detail for part of it, which is exactly the opposite of the way it technically should have been done. He also issued the welcome order that the attack would be delayed till 7 August, which gave a little more time for loading so that all the ships were buttoned up and steaming out of harbor by 22 July.

They reached Koro on the 28th and the men went into the rehearsal training whose value was instantly demonstrated when a number of the landing craft had engine casualties and could not leave the ships with the units assigned to them. The obvious arrangement to get around this was to pool all the landing craft instead of assigning each to a particular unit, and this arrangement was made. Meanwhile Fletcher's fleet had steamed in and command conferences began—the first time the leaders had met each other and with sailing day for the expedition less than 96 hours away.

There were four such commanders involved—Turner, Vandegrift, Fletcher as commander of the three carriers and their retinue (Task Force 61) and RearAdm V.A.C. Crutchley whose screening force consisted of the heavy cruisers *Quincy, Vincennes, Astoria, Chicago,* with the Australian heavies *Australia* and *Canberra,* the Australian light cruiser *Hobart,* the American antiaircraft cruiser *San Juan* with destroyers *quantum non sufficit.* There were eleven big transports, six small ones that were warmed-over destroyers and six big supply ships, these all under Turner's direct command.

As soon as the conference began, it became clear that all the officers involved had utterly different concepts of the operation. The marines down there at the ends of the earth knew of the war in general only that our forces had won a smashing victory at Midway. They had supposed this gave us full command of sky and ocean with all the time in the world to unload supply vessels when they reached Guadalcanal; with heavy warships cruising through the lagoon to furnish fire on call and carrier planes to dive-bomb in advance of the assaulting troops.

It was developed that this was by no means the case. Crutchley and his Australian ships were on loan from the MacArthur command and would have to return at an early date. Fletcher (who had been in action or close to it and consequently under heavy strain for months now and who looked pretty tired) held the view that his whole operation was a hit-and-run raid, setting the marines on the beach and then getting away. It could be nothing else; we by no means had command by sea or air. From Rabaul and the upper Solomons the Japs could bring in land-based planes far more numerous than he could fly from the decks of his fleet carriers. In the background they had at least five carriers of their own and a whole division of fast battleships while Fletcher possessed but one. The disparity in the cruiser and destroyer forces was similar. Not we, but they, had command of the sea if they chose to exercise it.

THE news appalled the Marine commander and his staff, who pointed out that in the 24 hours the fleet proposed to stay in the Guadalcanal area, they might barely get the troops ashore, but certainly not their supplies. There would even be a shortage of hands for handling what supplies they did have. It is usual for the replacement battalions to deal with such beachhead stevedoring labor and the 1st Marine Division had not yet received its replacement battalions. There was a long debate of the type one might expect from forthright men accustomed to command and unhappily it was a debate without a moderator, for Adm Ghormley, the only officer whose position enabled him to outrank all present, had remained in Wellington, sending up a captain to represent him. The end was a compromise under which Adm Fletcher agreed to keep his carrier force in the general area of the landing for three days, till D plus 4, Crutchley with his cruiser screening force to remain as long as necessary. The result

satisfied nobody and none felt that the subject had been fully canvassed, but time had them in its tyrannous grip and they must sail at dawn.

JUST before anchors were lifted some of the officers who had been clearing up fag ends of business in Wellington arrived by air. They brought with them copies of the local papers which all through the staffs produced horrified exclamations of "Jesus Christ!" The page one headlines carried a New York date line. For years after, no one in the 1st Marine Division would believe that there had not been a leak of a seriousness verging on treason; but it was not true, it was only coincidence verging on the improbable. Maj George Fielding Eliot, the military commentator, had been moved to remark that after Midway our strategic prospect in the Pacific was much improved; the Japanese no longer possessed the offensive; and though Allied resources were probably not equal to long range or large scale attacks, they were probably good enough to undertake an offensive of limited envergure against some such place within supporting distance from our bases as Rabaul, Tulagi, or Wake.

As far as he was concerned the names might have been drawn from a hat. They were there to indicate a wide range of possibility and Tulagi got in only because a Jap convoy had been smashed up there during the first phase of the battle of Coral Sea. But there were representatives of the New Zealand press in New York, on the prowl for news with "local appeal" back home; and to them Tulagi was a familiar word. They cabled the story and since cable tolls to New Zealand are high, they took out all Maj Eliot's conditional and modifying words, thus "Americans to Attack Tulagi."

The flagship was the transport *McCawley*. Tregaskis the correspondent noted how a couple of the marines on the weather deck had piles of half-dollars and were trying to skip them across the water like stones in a pond. "We won't have no use for money where we're going," they said.

To be Continued

Postwar Seabees

THE SEABEES, wartime buddies of the Marines, have been granted a lease on life to continue their onslaughts on the impossible. Recent Congressional appropriations allow for 7,000 construction workers, but Seabee commander RearAdm John J. Manning is striving for an additional 15,000.

Organized at the beginning of the war when employment of civilian construction workers under combat conditions became impossible, the Seabees grew from an original force of 3,300 to nearly 257,000 at the end of the war.

The postwar Seabees will serve four primary purposes: to work on secret Naval shore construction projects; to handle emergency construction assignments overseas, or isolated work where the letting of civilian contracts would not be feasible; to provide a skeleton organization which could be expanded quickly in the event of an emergency; and to reinforce the Marine Corps in the development of amphibious landing techniques.

In keeping with the trend to keep the Seabees alive, Civil Engineer Corps officers who directed them in their advanced base construction program are being invited to join a voluntary Reserve organization. The purpose of this organization would be to keep them abreast of developments in military engineering.

Questionnaires, asking for suggestions on the new organization, were mailed to the nearly 10,000 Reserve officers who served both abroad and in this country during the war.

Replies to these questionnaires indicate a desire for a decentralized organization of a professional nature. Also proposed was a program of monthly seminar meetings and a tentative inactive duty training program which may include periods of active duty with some Naval activity.

At the same time former Seabee warrant officers, as well as other qualified men and officers with a background of construction work, are being sought to fill approximately fifty vacancies in the regular U. S. Navy warrant officer grades.

Needed particularly for work at overseas naval bases and other projects, the warrant officers, including chief warrant officers, would be assigned to varied duties involving all types of naval shore maintenance and construction.

Former warrant and commissioned officers are eligible if they had not passed their thirty-seventh birthday on the date of their first appointment above chief petty officer.

Night Operations On Okinawa



WITH THE EXCEPTION of a few small night patrols, the early years of the war in the Pacific found little activity on the part of marines during the hours of darkness. Usually the marines were intent upon "tying in" their lines by late afternoon in order to repulse the inevitable Japanese counterattacks and to discourage attempts on the part of the enemy to infiltrate through the lines. The average marine was prone to think somewhat contemptuously of the nocturnal prowlings of the Japanese. As the war progressed, however, instances of Marine night operations became more prevalent. During the campaign for Okinawa, night operations were used more extensively than ever before and the results were extremely gratifying.

In the course of the long Ryukyu campaign, marines of the III Amphibious Corps and the Amphibious Reconnaissance Bn, FMF, Pacific, executed no less than 16 of these night operations. It is interesting to find that all of the night operations met with success.

At the close of the campaign for Okinawa, the Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, reported to the Commanding General, FMF, Pacific, that:

"All night operations were characterized by the fact that they were performed in an orthodox manner. Previous training in such maneuvers and existing doctrines on the subject were employed and proved sound. Daylight reconnaissance, a limited objective of a prominent terrain feature, explicit orders for all echelons, noise discipline, and contact were all as prescribed in the training manuals. In every case surprise was

On Okinawa the Marines gained excellent results in their night

achieved and the night attack or movement was successful."

Generally speaking, the night operations on Okinawa may be classified as follows:

1. Night reconnaissance operations.
2. Relief of front line units under cover of darkness.
3. Pre-dawn attacks designed to gain an objective from which to launch subsequent daylight attacks.

From the standpoint of time, the first of these nocturnal missions to be accomplished were the landings made by the Amphibious Reconnaissance Bn of FMF, Pacific, under Maj James L. Jones, on small islands adjacent to the mainland of Okinawa. On three successive nights prior to Love Day, the battalion landed on and reconnoitered Keise Shima, Aware Saki, Mae Shima and Kuro Shima. None of these landings were opposed, nor were enemy personnel found. However, much valuable information along with hydrographic reports, was sent to CG, Tenth Army, the echelon under whose command the battalion was operating.

By Capt James R. Stockman
Maps by Cpl C. F. Maguirk

Later, during the night of 5-6 April, 1945, the battalion landed on Tsugen Shima and ran into considerable enemy opposition; here it suffered two men killed and eleven wounded. Information gained, however, helped in the planning for a minor assault operation in which a unit from the 27th Infantry Division landed on and seized Tsugen Shima after a bitter fight.

Next night, elements of the battalion landed on Ike Shima, Taka Banare, Heanza Shima, and Hamahiki Shima. As a result of this night's work, the Tenth Army found out what it wanted to know: that these islands, guarding Chimu Bay, and Nagagusuku Bay, were not enemy strongpoints. Later, troops from the 1st Marine Division made a thorough reconnaissance of the above islands and found the initial reports made by the FMF Reconnaissance Bn to be essentially correct, despite the fact that the missions were of necessity executed hurriedly.

After a reconnaissance mission on the island of Kutakan, the battalion moved to the northwest of Okinawa and during the night of 7-8 April went ashore on Minna Shima. This island, within easy artillery range of Ie Shima, was held pending the arrival of garrison troops and artillery units; the latter were to support the landing on Ie Shima by providing fire from Minna Shima.

Following a brief respite, the battalion, now under control of the 6th Marine Division, landed on Sesoko Shima and Yagachi Shima, near Motobu Peninsula, where many civilians were found but no enemy.

In seven night operations the Amphibious Reconnaissance Bn, FMF, Pacific, gained valuable information about 13 islands and thus materially aided the planning of Tenth Army and III Amphibious Corps. Trained especially for this type of work, the battalion demonstrated that the basic rules of our training manuals which deal with night operations are fundamentally sound. Like all doctrine these rules work best when applied to a situation wherein properly trained units embark upon missions of suitable scope and character.

Although Maj Jones, the commanding officer of the battalion, was enthusiastic about the type of reconnaissance missions assigned his unit, he did point out one variance from the basic tenets of night operations that might have led to serious difficulties: During the night of 27-28 March, 1945, LCVPs, waiting offshore for the return of amphibious patrols from Aware Saki, were fired up by friendly LCIs engaged in picket duty. These LCIs had not been notified by higher echelon of the mission of the Recon Bn. Fortunately, no damage was done, but the incident emphasizes the necessity that "there should be explicit orders for all echelons."

In the tactical doctrine of our training manuals that deal with night operations, these factors are the ones most emphasized and which will tend to insure success, if properly understood and taken into account:

1. There should be a daylight reconnaissance made of the area immediately involved in the operation.
2. Preparations should begin during daylight.
3. A limited objective should be assigned; this should consist of a prominent, easily identifiable terrain feature.
4. There should be explicit orders for all echelons.
5. Noise discipline must be carried out.
6. Contact must be maintained.
7. When possible, fresh troops should be used.
8. The force involved should be limited in size.
9. Approaches to objective should permit silent movement.
10. Secrecy must be maintained if surprise is to be achieved.
11. There should be some directional aids (roads, fences, hedges, etc.)

operations by sticking to the manuals and orthodox procedures

Jap Night Operations on Okinawa

THE MARINES were not alone in planning night operations on Okinawa. The 32d Japanese Army attempted a night counterattack in force on 12-13 April and another one on 3-4 May. The interrogation report of Col Hirimichi Yahara, senior 32d Army staff officer captured at the conclusion of the campaign, throws some light on the enemy's analysis of the two attempts:

"The proponents of aggressive action finally were permitted to attempt a counterattack on the night of 12 April. The failure of the venture strengthened Yahara's position as the spokesman of the conservatives.

"The 62d Division was still holding the line alone with the 22d Regiment of the 24th Division reserve in the Nishibaru area. On the night of 9 or 10 April plans were drawn up at a staff meeting calling for three battalions of the 22d Regiment and three battalions of the 62d Division to infiltrate, scattering throughout the area between the lines and the objective line, 1500 yards north of Futema. The sector lines ran through the center of the island, with the 62d Division on the west and the 22d Regiment on the east. Within each sector one battalion was to occupy the northern one-third, and the last battalion the southern third. The men were to hide in caves and tombs, awaiting a suitable opportunity to attack on 13 April.

"The main advantage of the attack was that it would prevent the use of Blue [i.e., American] Naval Gunfire or artillery since the area would be occupied simultaneously by Blue and Japanese troops, thus enabling the Japanese to fight upon their own terms, i.e., hand-to-hand combat. On the other hand, the 22d Regiment was unfamiliar with the terrain. As it turned out, this factor accounted for the complete failure of the attack.

"Col Yahara opposed the attack and succeeded in reducing the forces participating to four battalions.

"The attack was launched as scheduled. As Col Yahara had predicted, the battalions of the 22d Regiment were bewildered by the terrain and by dawn had made only 500 yards. They were forced to retreat, suffering heavy casualties. The 62d Division battalions fared somewhat better, one battalion advancing to TA 8378 remaining there throughout the day of 13 April and returning that night with low casualties.

"On about 20 April, the Japanese began to move troops north in anticipation of a Blue landing in the Yonabaru area. The 62d Division, reinforced on the right (east) flank by the 22d Regiment was holding a line from Onaga-Kochi-Hill 187 to the Machinato airfield. Even the blindest staff officer was growing aware that Blue forces would eventually break through any defenses the Japanese could establish. As yet the Japanese had not suffered crippling casualties and in the opinion of many officers the time was ripe to strike a "decisive" blow.

"Gen Cho, Chief of Staff, always a proponent of aggressive action, was instrumental in the decision to stage the counterattack. Cho was vigorously supported by Fujioka, CG of the 32d Division, who expressed the general desire of his men to fight the decisive action in the 62d Division zone of defense. Col Yahara opposed the attack as being premature but was overridden.

"The plan was ambitious. The 23d and 26th Shipping Engineer Regiments were to effect counter-landings on the west and east coast respectively during the night of 3-4 May. On 4 May, the 24th Division (89th Regiment on the east, 22d in the center, and 32d Regiment on the West) were to launch an attack with Futema as the objective. The 44th Independent Mixed Brigade was to follow the 24th Division bearing west to the coast, thus cutting off the 1st Marine Division. The 62d Division did not participate in the attack.

"It was, it is Col Yahara's opinion, the decisive action of the campaign. The Japanese were so weakened by its failure that they lost all hope of taking any further offensive action. On 5 May, Gen Ushijima called Col Yahara to his office and, with tears in his eyes, declared that he would in the future be guided by Yahara's decisions."

On American night tactics Col Yahara made this comment:

"American night attacks were particularly effective, taking the Japanese completely by surprise. The Japanese had so accustomed themselves to ceasing organized hostilities at nightfall, and, except for the ubiquitous Kirikomitai, reorganizing and relaxing during the night that attacks in these hours caught them both physically and psychologically off-guard."

12. There must be good leadership on all levels.

The first night attack of any consequence launched by a Marine unit on Okinawa took place at 0300, 10 May. After seizing all of northern Okinawa, the 6th Marine Division was ordered to take over the west portion of the Tenth Army line in southern Okinawa. Initially, the zone of action assigned the division was suitable for a regiment; the 22d Marines moved up to positions south of Machinato on the high ground north of the Asa river where it relieved elements of the 7th Marines on 8 May. On the right flank lay the sea, to the left the 1st Marine Division, now fighting for Hill 60, Dakeski Ridge and cleaning up the Awacha pocket. There was no room for maneuver to the left; to the front there was a natural barrier, the Asa river; beyond it lay a line of hills, heavily fortified by the enemy. MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., was faced with the problem of crossing the river before he could launch an attack in his zone of action. Orders from Tenth Army, modified by III Amphibious Corps, designated the hills south of the Asa as the objective line to be reached before 11 May, the date set for a coordinated drive to overwhelm Japanese Gen Ushijima's fortress stronghold based on the Shuri hill mass. To carry out its part, the 6th Division had to secure these hills to be on its proper line of departure for the big attack.

THE decision reached by the staff of the 6th Division was to cross the Asa at night, seize the first high ground to the south immediately, and continue the attack. Patrols crossed the Asa on 9 May and reconnoitered the south side; one firefight resulted.

The area occupied by the 22d Marines on 8-9 May was under constant observation by the enemy. His guns, in sporadic bursts, harassed the troops in their positions each day and night. To attempt to move any sizable body of troops down from the hills into the valley of Asa, in order to cross the river during daylight hours, was unthinkable. With his artillery and mortars sighted in on this area, and with unlimited observation, the enemy could have easily decimated any company, battalion, or regiment that tried to cross. In deciding to cross the river in force under the cover of darkness, Gen Shepherd was aware of the fact that although such a scheme held dangers, it would be cheaper, probably, in terms of men's lives than a daylight crossing.

Shortly after dark on 9 May, the 6th Engineer Bn began the construction of a footbridge on the Asa Estuary. The footbridge, intended for the use of the 3rd Bn, was completed shortly before 0300 on the morning of 10 May and a few troops crossed it before it was destroyed by a Japanese suicide demolition team. It is obvious then that the attack was not an out-and-out surprise to the enemy. The partial loss of the surprise element, however, did not prevent the two assault battalions of the 22d Marines from crossing the river prior to dawn; daylight found them fighting for the regiment's first objective. By night, the regiment held a bridgehead about 1400 yards long and 300 yards deep. It was in position to launch its drive toward Naha.

Many of the desirable features for a night attack were not present in this operation. The element of surprise could not be wholly attained, although no pre-attack artillery barrage announced the jump-off. Unfortunately, there was some illumination by adjacent units. The main provisions mandatory in such an attack were well executed. Objectives were easily discernible and understood by the assaulting troops. Each unit understood perfectly its mission and the extent of its zone of action. A Jap counterattack in force after daylight, and before the river was bridged so that supporting troops and weapons could cross, might have placed the attack in jeopardy, and conceivably could have spelled failure. That such an attack did not materialize may be traced to our heavy artillery and naval gunfire, as well as air strikes, which prevented the enemy from massing any sizable group for such a counterattack. This left the assault battalions free to devote their energies to their primary task—the seizure of the first hills and ridges.

By using a night attack, then, the 22d Marines were able to cross the Asa river in force and commence offensive operations at dawn where a daylight crossing would have meant heavy casualties from observed enemy fire on presited areas. In addition, by crossing before dawn, the assault battalions had a maximum number of daylight hours in which to fight for their objective.

CHRONOLOGICALLY, the next important night operation took place during the night of 13-14 May when the 5th Marines relieved the 1st Marines in an area that was right under the nose of the Japs.

By 13 May the 1st Marines had fought into the low ground west of Dakeshi Ridge and northwest of Wana Ridge where the enemy was emplaced in great strength and with numerous weapons at his command. Unfortunately, the 1st Marines had no good ground for maneuver; the troops were under constant enemy observation from their left flank and left front. Forward progress was virtually impossible and what little was made occurred on the extreme right of the regiments zone of action where a railroad embankment gave some cover from the intense enemy fire.



After 13 straight days of action, the regiment was weary and depleted in strength. It was time for it to be relieved. MajGen Pedro del Valle, CG of the 1st Marine Division, ordered the 5th Marines to relieve the 1st Marines in the latter's positions on the front line during the night of 13 May. Before moving up, the relieving battalions of the 5th Marines sent reconnaissance parties to determine the best routes forward and to study the positions of the 1st Marines. Beginning well after midnight, units began to move up into position with a few men of the 5th effecting the relief at a time. By dawn of 14 May all three battalions of the 1st Marines were relieved and the 5th Marines were in position ready for the day's attack. This relief could not have been accomplished during the hours of daylight and under the very nose of the enemy without risking heavy casualties.

During the early morning hours of 29 May the 22d Marines executed a night operation in order to cross the east-west canal that divides the city of Naha. On 28 May the 6th Marine Division had found its front lines somewhere in the shape of the letter "L." Forming the long axis was the 29th Marines facing the hills to the south that overlooked the Kokuba river. To the right and facing southeast was the 22d Marines, forming the short part of the L. Barring their forward progress was the Naha Canal, an inconvenient but not insurmountable object. At this time Gen Shepherd ordered his division's attack reoriented, with the emphasis to be placed on the attack of the 22d Marines.

To launch their attack on 29 May, the 22d Marines were ordered to put an assault battalion across the canal under the cover of darkness in order to avoid needless casualties. A daylight crossing would have placed the assault companies in an extremely vulnerable position. As usual, the enemy had excellent observation of the canal area from Telegraph Hill, (the regiment's first objective), and from the high hills across the Kokuba river to the south.

Soon after nightfall on 28 May members of the 6th Engineer Bn began to construct footbridges across the Naha Canal at three points. The work was done swiftly and silently; at 0420 the little bridges were completed. Ten minutes later "A" and "B" companies of the 1st Bn 22d Marines, began to cross. Immediately upon reaching the other side, the companies reorganized and at 0500—just prior to dawn—began to attack. The enemy was completely surprised and for thirty minutes offered no resistance. After that there was sporadic rifle and machine gun fire

but the enemy had lost the opportunity to inflict heavy casualties upon the 1st Bn during the two periods when its troops were exposed; (a) during the crossing of the canal and (b) during the reorganization on the opposite bank. Although there was some intense fighting during the day, the pre-dawn crossing and dawn attack led to the capture of more ground than would have otherwise been possible, and with less cost in lives.

DURING the evening of 1 June, LtGen Roy S. Geiger, CG III Amphibious Corps, asked MajGen Shepherd, CG 6th Marine Division, to study the practicability of a shore-to-shore landing on Oroku Peninsula. Plans were laid immediately for an amphibious reconnaissance of the peninsula. In order to make its final decision, the G-3 section of the Division sent a night patrol across from Naha to the northwestern tip of Oroku to probe the Japanese defenses, to examine the beaches, and to estimate the strength of the enemy deployed in this area.

Maj Anthony Walker, in command of the Reconnaissance Co, divided the patrol into four 4-man units, each with its own plastic boat and its particular mission. The teams were to land abreast in the southern shore of the estuary. First the beaches would be examined and then the defenses based near the mouth of the wide northern corridor; the patrol was to check on defensive installations, roads, and movements of troops.

Well after dusk, and before moonrise, on 2 June, the patrol started out. The crossing of the estuary was uneventful although it appeared that surprise might not be achieved. Despite instructions issued early in the day that star shell illumination would not be fired until the patrol returned, one ship failed to get the word and fired several star shell rounds while the little plastic boats were being paddled across the broad entrance to the estuary.

To those waiting for the patrol to return, it seemed at the time that the attempt might have failed. A few hours after the boats had disappeared in the darkness on their way to the peninsula, there came the sound of mortars and a few sharp bursts of small arms fire. By 0300 the last boat had returned; the reconnaissance was successful. Each team had accomplished its mission, and none had lost a man. One team had a brief brush with a Japanese patrol as it came back to the beach. Small arms fire was exchanged and the Japanese pumped out a few rounds of mortar fire, searching aimlessly for the marines. The other teams had walked along the roads past uneasy groups of civilians and near Japanese installations where they could hear soldiers talking or eating.

Intelligence gained by this patrol indicated that the northern part of Oroku Peninsula was occupied by the enemy, but not in great strength. The proposed landing beaches were not ideal but could be used. On the basis of this intelligence, the G-3 section drew up its plans and Gen Shepherd ordered an amphibious assault at dawn on 4 June. The landing, made by the 4th Marines, was successful and the Japanese on Oroku were taken by surprise, initially. The results achieved underline the desirability of conducting a night reconnaissance when specific intelligence data is not otherwise available.

At 2030, 11 June, orders were received by the 1st Bn, 7th Marines, to continue the attack to seize Kunishi ridge, a heavily defended position, at 0300, 12 June. Efforts to get across the open compartment on 11 June had failed; the valley between Tera and Kunishi was swept by enemy fire of all types. A night attack was the only alternative. The 1st Bn's commanding officer called the commander of the 2d Bn, 7th Marines, and made arrangements with the latter in order to coordinate the attack of the two battalions. Initially each battalion was to send one company across the fire-swept valley to seize and hold the ridge in the regimental zone of action. So that the attack would be oriented correctly a road in the right of the 1st Bn's zone was to be used for a guide.

Moving up along the little road, Co C contacted Co F of the 2d Bn at 0225 and the two assault companies of the two battalions went forward slowly and met no resistance while climbing the ridge. The Japanese were caught by surprise. Co C killed about ten of the enemy and managed to get its 3d Platoon set up on a line before the Japs could offer resistance. The 2d Platoon tried to extend to the east on the left of the 3d Platoon but by this time the Nips cut loose with a mortar barrage and forced the platoon to withdraw back to the 3d Platoon.

Co B tried to follow out the plan of the attack to reinforce C on the ridge but daylight and the aroused Japanese caught the company in the valley approaching the ridge. Heavy machine gun and artillery fire forced the company back until two of our tanks came up to assist in the attack. A 47mm enemy antitank gun knocked out one tank and forced the other off the road. Co B could not advance in the face of such fire.

REQUESTS for more troops came back from Co C and the battalion began to ferry six men in each tank from Co A. Although the trips were slow and few, due to enemy fire, about a platoon got over this way and built up a line on the left of Co C. At 1300 the valley was smoked and Co B and Co G of the 2d Bn, in an attempt to reinforce the ridge moved forward simultaneously. Tanks were out to support the advance. No enemy artillery or mortar fire was

received but machine gun fire crisscrossed the valley, pinning down the advancing troops and forcing them to withdraw to await the cover of darkness.

Co F had attained the ridge with the same ease that marked C's attack, but Co G, like B, tried crossing the valley three times that day only to be driven back by heavy enemy fire. Under the cover of darkness, the 2d Bn moved both G and E across the valley and up on the ridge to form a tight perimeter with F and the 1st Bn B, and the remainder of A crossed at the same time, and before midnight all the rifle companies of the two battalions were holding the ridge.

DURING the afternoon of 13 June, the 2d Bn, 1st Marines, was given a warning order calling for an attack on Kunishi Ridge at 0500 on the following morning. Arrangements were made for supporting fires from tanks, M-7's, 37's and 4.2 mortars, artillery and naval gunfire. The ridge was known to be held by a sizable force. The nearest adjacent friendly units consisted of the Army on the left in the town of Ozato and elements of the 7th Marines now on the western part of Kunishi Ridge, but about 300-400 yards west of the regimental boundary.

After a plan had been decided upon, and the word passed to the troops, a change in orders was made—sometime after dark—advancing the time of attack from 0500 to 0300, 14 June. Due to the lack of observation, the planned fires from all supporting weapons except the artillery were eliminated. It was also requested that all flares be stopped prior to and during the attack until daylight, so that movements of the troops would not be silhouetted.

After a half hour artillery preparation well to the front (lack of observation would not permit the fire to be brought down close to the troops), the assault companies, E and G, commenced to move forward. By 0500 Co E had its assault platoons on the topographical crest of the ridge, but by this time the enemy was aware of the attack and commenced firing in such heavy volume that the remainder of the company could not advance to join the platoons on the crest. Co G had moved out behind E and by 0530 had its 3d Platoon tied in on E's left flank. From the defilade afforded by a low ledge on the side of the ridge, the 2d Platoon was fed forward, one or two men at a time, and built up a line on the left of the 3d Platoon. By this time the men on the ridge found their positions precarious. They were receiving enemy fire of all types from their front and flanks, and from the canefields to the rear snipers plagued them. The enemy in the fields below and to the rear of the platoons on the ridge denied all the ground between the assault and rear elements. Casualties began to mount and the battalion turned to the only hope that was left—the tanks.

Enemy 47mm fire made the route to the ridge very dangerous for the tanks, but they managed to cross the open approaches and commenced to evacuate the most seriously wounded men first, taking them up through the escape hatches. Each tank brought up food, water, and ammunition and then carried wounded back to battalion aid stations on the return trip.

The plight of the assault companies on the ridge is not connected in any way with the night attack. The ridge, heavily defended, was a serious obstacle that had to be reduced. In order to get at close grips with the enemy and yet not lose too many men while crossing the unprotected approaches to the ridge, there was only one suitable method of attack. The ease with which Co E succeeded in seizing the topographical crest of the ridge justified the use of a night attack. It is surprising that the artillery preparation did not warn the enemy; that it did not, may be explained by pointing out that a great deal of artillery fire was used at intervals every night. Surprise was certainly achieved in this case.

SOON after the capture of Oroku Peninsula, the 6th Marine Division was called upon to take an active part in the final drive to the southern coast of Okinawa. The situation confronting the division on 16 June was much like the one on 8 May when the 22d Marines took over the western portion of the III Amphibious Corps line near the Asa river. Again the 22d Marines was chosen as the first regiment of the 6th Division to enter the lines for the final drive and it was a coincidence that the regiment was relieving elements of the 7th Marines, just as it had done near the Asa. In order to effect the relief and passage of lines, it was necessary to execute a night operation.

The 7th Marines were fighting on the reverse slope of Kunishi Ridge and were suffering from serious supply and evacuation difficulties resulting from heavy enemy mortar, artillery, machine gun and small arms fire which blanketed and crisscrossed the valley between Tera and Kunishi. It was virtually impossible to cross this valley except with tanks. All troop movements had to be effected under the cover of darkness. Troops on Kunishi were supplied by emergency airdrops, and casualties were carried out in tanks.

On 16 June Col Harold C. Roberts, CO, 22d Marines, held a meeting of his battalion commanders and issued his warning order which called for the 1st and 3d Bns to relieve elements of the 7th Marines on Kunishi Ridge prior to dawn on 17 June, and to be prepared to launch an attack at 0700.

The battalion commanders then sent preliminary reconnaissance parties to find the best

routes forward. The day of 16 June was spent in preparation for the forward movement.

At 0300, 17 June, the two battalions commenced to move quickly across the valley south of Tera and up on Kunishi Ridge. Noise discipline was excellent; nothing happened to warn the enemy of the movement of troops. By 0515 the reliefs had been completed and the 22d Marines began to use supporting arms to soften up the targets on the day's objective line. Promptly at 0700 the two assault battalions attacked to seize Mezado Ridge. A successful night operation paved the way for a satisfactory daylight attack.



In this instance, it is noticeable that the 22d Marines were able to plan and prepare for a night operation according to the principles laid down in our training manuals. Planning began a sufficient length of time in advance so that the area to be crossed could be reconnoitered and studied. The assault battalions had opportunity to find out exactly where they were going, how to get there, and what to do after they got there. The valley between Tera and Kunishi could not have been crossed by any body of troops during daylight hours without incurring extremely heavy casualties. By crossing it at night, a fresh regiment was in position on 17 June, ready to continue the attack with its assault units intact.

In order to continue its drive to the coast, the 1st Marine Division needed fresh troops to put into the line. On 15 June, the 8th Marines, one of the regiments of the 2d Marine Division, landed on Oroku Peninsula and passed to the control of the 1st Marine Division. Initially, the 8th Marines took up positions 2000-4000 yards north of Itoman. The day of 16 June was spent in this area, and next morning the regimental command post was moved south to Tera. Orders were then issued to the 2d Bn to relieve the 2d Bn, 7th Marines, on Mezado Ridge prior to 0700, 18 June, and be prepared to continue the attack toward Ibanu Ridge at that hour. During the same night the 3d Bn, 8th Marines, was ordered to relieve the 3d Bn, 7th Marines, on Kunishi Ridge.

The area between Tera and Kunishi Ridge was still under enemy fire and to cross that valley during daylight hours was to invite needless casualties. Shortly after midnight, the 2d Bn, 8th Marines, commenced to move forward from its bivouac area far to the north of Tera and by daylight had relieved the 2d Bn, 7th Marines, on Mezado. In the meantime the 3d Bn, 8th Marines, had effected the relief of the same battalion of the 7th on Kunishi.

At 0700, the 2d Bn jumped off in attack toward Ibaru according to plan. In the reliefs and passage of lines, involving the movement of four battalions. there were only a few casualties. With dawn, Gen del Valle was able to continue the drive to the south with fresh troops on the

line and fresh troops in immediate reserve. By virtue of using a night operation, it was possible, therefore, to not only maintain the momentum of attack, but to increase the pressure in a very economical manner. The 8th Marines found no difficulty in following the precepts laid down in training manuals in conducting this night operation.

A study of night operations conducted by Marine units during the Okinawa operation reveals that:

1. Orthodox methods are good methods.
2. A correct estimate of the situation is a major contributing factor toward success.
3. Night operations need not be confined to highly specialized units.
4. Such operations afford echelon commanders with an excellent tactical device.
5. Present doctrine is quite satisfactory for the training and indoctrination of troops.

In planning a night operation, the S-3 or G-3 will do well to keep in mind four factors. One, in a sense, is a constant; the rest are highly variable. The constant is, of course, the "Book." The importance of its rules governing night operations, particularly the military Big Three—direction, control, and surprise—cannot be overestimated. The three variables are: (a) the enemy (b) own troops (c) terrain.

In that part of the Marine Corps Hymn that goes, "In the air, on land and sea" one can easily imagine the implication, "by day or night." The extensive use of night operations during the Okinawa Campaign seems to prove it. USMC

Armed Forces Leave Act

THE "Armed Forces Leave Act of 1946" legislation (HR 4051) granting terminal leave to enlisted men was signed recently by the President.

Under the bill evolved by a conference committee, unused leave may be accumulated from 8 September 1939 through 31 August 1946 not to exceed 120 days, including terminal leave already taken by officers, but after 31 August all members of the armed forces will be limited to a maximum of 60 days of terminal leave.

Leave will be accumulated, as before, at the rate of 2½ days a month.

Settlement and compensation will be made entirely in cash when the amount due is less than $50, in the case of any enlisted man discharged, separated, or released from active duty prior to 1 January 1943, and in cases of death or mental incapacitation in which dependents would collect.

In the case of leave accumulated as an enlisted man, it will be paid on the and in cash to the full extent of any balance." The bonds will be non-negotiable, will mature in five years, but may be used at any time in payment of premiums or in payment in conversion of a government life insurance policy.

In the case of leave accumulated as an enlisted man, it will be paid on the "Basis of the base and longevity pay applicable" on the date of his discharge if discharged before 31 August 1946, or on 31 August 1946 if not so discharged, and an allowance computed at the rate of 70 cents a day for subsistence, plus in the case of enlisted men of the first three grades with dependents on 31 August 1946, or former enlisted men with dependents at the time of discharge if prior to that date, an allowance computed at the rate of $1.25 a day for quarters."

In the case of leave accumulated as a warrant or commissioned officer, it will be paid on the "basis of the base and longevity pay and allowances" applicable to each man on 31 August 1946.

In the future, reenlistment furloughs up to 90 days will be deducted from "leave accrued during active service prior to reenlistment or charged against any leave which may accrue during future active service or both." Leave accrued during service prior to retirements made after enactment of this law "may be carried over to the period of service after retirement."

WHAT Good IS A Pistol?

By Maj John D. Cooper

IN A previous issue of the GAZETTE, Maj Brooke Nihart continued the discussion of "Pistol versus Carbine." The ideas he expressed were certainly well designed to provoke argument, and I'd like to rise to the bait and air a few opinions of my own on the subject.

For the benefit of those who missed Maj Nihart's article, his answer to the "Pistol vs. Carbine" argument was, "Why not both?," the idea being that each infantryman, in addition to his flat trajectory offensive weapon should carry a supplementary defensive firearm for emergency close combat. In addition to the theoretical arguments supporting his case, Maj Nihart pointed to the numbers of infantrymen in both theaters of the late war who acquired pistols of one description or another and packed them voluntarily as long as they were permitted.

It was then argued that the current U. S. service pistol is unsatisfactory for the purpose and should be replaced by another type offering lighter weight, a quicker first shot, and "sufficient" shock power. It was to be carried in a redesigned holster offering both speed and security, and above all was to be "easy to shoot."

At first glance, Maj Nihart's proposal seems somewhat startling, and after some consideration, I remain no less dubious. The view is widely held that the infantryman has plenty to carry as is, even when he is stripped to the barest fighting essentials, without giving him a sidearm and ammunition as well.

Granted that the pistol is not appreciated properly in modern military circles, and that an entirely new training system will do much to correct this, I still don't believe the handgun's place is among the multitude of gadgets, gizmos, and other impedimenta with which the foot soldier is already burdened.

It is true that a rifle may jam or break, but when this possibility is balanced against the additional bother involved in carrying a pistol, holster, spare magazine and ammunition, I do not believe many will champion the auxiliary sidearm.

It is true that a pistol might quite conceivably save a man's life if his rifle failed. So might a steel plate inserted between him and his opponent. While it is ridiculous to compare the relative portability of a pistol and a suit of armor, the principle remains the same. The result is not worth the effort.

Some consideration must be given to the quite accurate observation that many soldiers voluntarily burden themselves with this extra weapon if given the opportunity. I believe there are several reasons behind this that are not necessarily valid from our standpoint, no matter how important they may seem to the individual. First is the insatiable American urge to acquire souvenirs and loot. An enemy pistol is prized perhaps above all other items by the "battlefield art collector." Second is the feeling of swank that seems to accompany him who "packs a rod." Handguns seem to have a more or less romantic appeal to Americans in general, brought up on stories of Wild Bill Hickok, Jesse James, Billy the Kid, and the Dillinger type of public enemy.

Third is the widespread tendency to believe in the superiority of foreign and unfamiliar weapons. A great many Americans are quite fascinated by something labeled "Luger" or "Nambu" and feel that anything as exotic as this must possess strange and deadly properties.

Fourth, large sums of money may be obtained by trading on the above characteristics present in one's comrades-in-arms. And last is the quite valid reason that many men whose primary requirements are better met by the pistol, find themselves saddled with a rifle and wish to remedy this situation.

So while I believe that there is a wider need for the pistol in our modern organization, I do not believe that the concept of a "two-gun infantryman" is sound.

But, if we discard Maj Nihart's proposal, is there a place for the pistol in modern war? Is there anything the pistol will do that the carbine won't do better? As a pistol bug I naturally believe there is, but I don't think it will be recognized until a more practical training system is adopted.

It seems that the more warfare develops, the smaller is the percentage of troops actually in contact with the enemy. It has been estimated that less than one fourth of a modern ground force is actually involved in close personal combat.

Better training, not a better weapon, is needed to insure confidence in the pistol

In addition to personnel who are in need of a defensive weapon *only* in the course of their regular activities, there are many men whose principal offensive weapon is crew-served and at the same time is designed to be operated in close proximity to the enemy. Examples are bazookas, flame throwers, machine guns, company mortars, antitank guns, assault guns, and tanks. Operators of these weapons have a definite need for an efficient weapon that is out of the way, ever present, and instantly available in all circumstances. Its effective range need be only the distance an enemy can throw a grenade. for generally at greater distances there is sufficient time to permit the primary weapon involved to be used against personnel. (The mortar is the exception to this and its crew may have to have some flat trajectory, mid-range weapon for defensive purposes.) These men, if they were trained to hit with the pistol, and consequently had confidence in it, would be more efficiently armed for their jobs with the sidearm than the carbine.

There is yet another field in which the pistol is outstanding and that is hand-to-hand combat. Usually, of course, this type of fracas occurs, if at all, as the conclusion of a more conventional fire fight, and it is impractical to carry two types of weapons and shift at the turning point, but occasionally a situation will develop where close combat is deliberately sought by the attacker at the outset of the engagement. Trench raiding in static warfare, patrolling in large ruined cities, combat inside buildings, and certain types of night attacks are examples. Here the pistol in the hand of a practical shot is a formidable weapon. When your first glimpse of your adversary is at a range of about ten yards, the speed, handiness, and, perhaps most of all, the emphatic wallop of the pistol are distinct advantages.

And lastly, police and occupation duty, in which marines have been and will be engaged for quite some time, has many phases in which the pistol is called for. In addition to activities in the line of duty, liberty and recreation in many parts of the world today are distinctly hazardous for the occupying forces. The commander is compelled in such cases to restrict his entire force indefinitely or let his men carry arms at all times. In the latter case I believe no one will deny the desirability of the handgun.

The first stumbling block in the design and employment of pistols is the widely held conception that a pistol is a substitute rifle. This is basically unsound. The two weapons are designed for entirely different purposes and they meet entirely different requirements. Fundamentally speaking, the rifle is an offensive arm, designed to be carried by an individual prepared and intending to carry the fight to his adversary. Therefore its requisites are accuracy, range, power, and rapidity of fire, roughly in that order. As long as it can be carried by one man without undue fatigue, weight and handiness are not too important, and speed in getting off the first shot from a safe carrying condition is a secondary consideration.

On the other hand the handgun is basically a defensive weapon. Western movies to the contrary, a man who knows what he is doing does not deliberately set out to kill, armed only with a pistol (unless of course he is forced to be surreptitious about it.) It must be assumed that the man who carries a pistol is primarily concerned with matters other than immediate combat with the enemy.

Which grip is the more natural? The author claims that Americans prefer the revolver for mainly traditional reasons which are counterbalanced by the more natural position of the hand in gripping the automatic. The author suggests the automatic's grip be reworked to give it more slant and a slight curve.

It is at once apparent that handgun requirements are different. I would list reliability, speed of first shot, maximum shock power, and rapidity of fire, in that order, as essentials. Speed of reloading is next. Range and penetration are secondary considerations, and if we discard Maj Nihart's conception of the pistol as an auxiliary to the rifle, light weight is not particularly important. Accuracy sufficient to hit the vital zone of a man at 50 yards is adequate. (And this is arbitrary since the weapon is almost never used at this range.)

NOW it is obvious that either weapon can be used for purposes other than those intended. No law prohibits quick draws with a rifle or sniping with a pistol, but best results are not obtained this way. The "substitute rifle" complex previously mentioned is responsible for a form of training and competition requiring men to hit small, stationary, round black spots at fixed ranges, starting with the weapon out and unlocked, and given much more than enough time. I don't wish to convey the impression that target shooting is easy. On the contrary, it is so difficult as to be impractical. Even the relatively simple pistol qualification course is apt to discourage beginners and destroy their confidence in the weapon. The fact is that the pistol is just not a sniping weapon, and the ability of a few individuals, using special arms, to do wonders at this kind of shooting does not alter the matter. Shooting at a bull's-eye at 50 yards with a .45 automatic is quite comparable to hauling a plow with a Ford convertible coupe. It can be done—you may have to do it—but it is rather silly to make an issue of it.

When the pistol is properly used as a rapid fire defensive weapon and training is pointed toward this type of employment, truly astonishing results can be obtained, and even the relatively unskilled beginner is given a feeling of confidence in his weapon and in his ability to defend himself.

In series of tests carried out during the past few months, the following capabilities were established as completely practicable with the service automatic as it now stands. The shooter involved was familiar with the pistol but by no means an expert shot on the conventional course. A total of about 24 hours, in two-hour stretches, was spent on the range. This is not an unfeasible expenditure of time on a peacetime schedule. In all cases the holster used was a spring type shoulder model which will be described later.

1. With the pistol cocked and on safe, it was found possible to draw and hit a man in a vital zone *every time*, at a range of 25 feet, in from 3/5 to 4/5 of a second.

2. From the same condition of readiness, it was possible to draw and hit each of three silhouettes twice in four seconds. This central silhouette was 15 yards from the gun. The two side silhouettes at a 30 degree angle of divergence.

3. It was possible to draw and hit four silhouettes at different angles and ranges from 5 to 20 yards, using the sights, in four seconds.

4. In the FBI practical pistol course, which involves shooting with and without sights, right and left handed, quick draws, and reloading against time, at ranges from 7 to 60 yards, it was possible to hit the vital zone of a man 48 out of 50 shots.

These tests lead me to believe that the awkwardness and unwieldiness attributed to the service automatic are largely a matter of personal idiosyncrasy. For every man who thinks the service pistol is muzzle heavy, one can be found who hangs weights on the barrel of his Woodsman to produce what he personally regards as better balance. I do not believe that the service pistol is perfect—I will give my suggestions for its improvement shortly—but I do believe that excellent results can be obtained with it, *provided a proper training system is used.*

As to handling qualities, it is my belief that most critics of the service pistol have been brought up on a revolver, and to a man used to a revolver, the automatic does seem awkward. However, a glance at the illustration contrasting the grips of the two weapons should convince the open-minded observer that the hand is definitely more relaxed and natural gripping the automatic pistol than gripping the revolver.

IF, however, most Americans are brought up on a revolver and consequently more used to it, there must be a reason. I believe the reasons for the preference of the revolver to the automatic in this country are as follows:

The revolver is capable of being carried in a safe condition and fired by simply pulling a trigger. This double action feature, permitting a much faster first shot, is *the* big advantage of the six-gun. This feature has now been incorporated into one military and at least three pocket model automatic pistols. As Maj Nihart suggests, it should definitely be adopted in any future sidearm to be developed.

Second, revolvers are thought by many to be more reliable than automatic pistols. This argument was once valid, but pistols have been developed to a point today where it is largely academic. It is true that an automatic will jam if it is oiled and then rolled in dry sand. So will a revolver. It is true that parts may break on an automatic. They will also break on a revolver and they are less easily replaced in this weapon. The revolver does provide a degree of "misfire security" not obtainable in any known form of automatic pistol. That is to say, a cartridge with a bad primer does not force the revolver user to clear his gun—he simply snaps it again, firing a new cartridge. However, the need for

this type of security is almost entirely eliminated in modern ammunition.

Third, revolvers are older in America than automatic pistols and have more tradition. The old western six-gun looms large in the subconscious of most Americans when they are discussing or handling firearms.

Last, revolvers perform better on conventional target ranges as rifle substitutes than do automatics. The chief reason for this is the superior trigger mechanism turned out by most factories on their revolvers. A Smith & Wesson police revolver, right off the assembly line, has a better trigger pull than is usually obtainable on most automatics even after considerable doctoring. This is not an absolute factor. It can be changed by better manufacturing methods.

The fixed barrel of the revolver does provide somewhat better long range accuracy than the sliding barrel of the automatic, but here again we are discussing abstractions. If a man wants to punch small groups in a paper target, he can use a rifle, not an arm designed primarily for instantaneous self-defense.

SO we may conclude that a properly designed automatic pistol is superior to a revolver in almost every way, if we are talking about defensive weapons and not toys.

Since we have brought up the matter both here and previously of a properly designed automatic pistol, let's look at what we mean by "proper design." First, we should by all means retain the service cartridge. It may take a little more effort to handle the larger pistol, but it pays off in paralyzing destructive force, which is necessary in emergencies.

Around this cartridge, we should build a double action automatic pistol. Double action is now found in the German P-38 and could easily be adapted to our needs. The pistol should possess a double column Mauser type magazine as Maj Nihart suggests. This will work just as well with the .45 cartridge as it does in the Colt-Browning model of 1935, designed for the German Luger cartridge. We already have such magazines for our Thompson, Reising, and M-3 sub-machine guns. The frame of the grip could easily be thinned down so that its over-all size would not be too great. This would give the weapon a magazine capacity of about 12 cartridges. As I have stated before, I believe that the pitch and general grip in the service automatic is satisfactory, but for the benefit of those who are more used to revolvers or the Woodsman-Luger type of automatic, the grip could be reworked, given more slant and slightly curved. This is really unimportant since, within limits, whatever the shooter is used to will perform well for him.

Next I would like to incorporate a slightly more reliable feeding mechanism into this hypothetical pistol. As all shooters know, the sheet metal magazine of the conventional automatic pistol is the weak point in the entire feeding system. Nine jams in ten are caused by bent lips or dented sides in the magazine. There are three ways this problem can be met. The first is to eliminate the removable magazine entirely and charge the weapon from above, as is done in the case of the Mauser military pistol, the Steyr-Hahn pistol, and more familiarly, in the '03 rifle. This system has the disadvantage of being slow and rendering the pistol inoperative during the loading operation. The second system is to make the magazine, or at least the open end of it, out of a machined forging rather than stamped sheet metal. This was done in the obsolete Mars pistol manufactured in England in the early part of the century. Its disadvantage is greatly increased expense. The third system has been worked out by the Russians in their Tokarev pistol. The cartridges are contained in a sheet metal magazine but the feed bearing surfaces are machined into the frame, eliminating the danger of deforming the magazine lips outside of the pistol. This is possibly the most practical solution. It was so regarded by the Russians who built the Tokarev with reliability always foremost in mind.

ON this point of reliability, it seems to me that Maj Nihart has neglected a critical aspect of pistol design when he recommends the abandonment of the Colt type tilting lock on the grounds that it is inherently less accurate than the straight sliding barrel of the Luger, P-38, and Nambu. If a weapon can group its shots in the vital zone of a man at 50 yards and gives an edge of even 20 per cent reliability over a more accurate type, I would recommend it in every case. It is interesting to note that of the three modern military pistols, the Colt-Browning 1935, the P-38, and the Tokarev, two use the tilting barrel system because of its increased reliability. The P-38 alone does not and it has yet to be proved that this weapon is as dependable as the other two.

As much attention as possible should be paid to a trigger mechanism permitting a reasonably light, crisp, single action let-off, similar to the factory pulls now turned out on Colt and Smith & Wesson police revolvers.

One more feature I would like to incorporate into the ideal sidearm, and that is a system of field stripping which will allow such critical moving parts as the mainspring, firing pin, and trigger mechanism to be thoroughly cleaned, dried, and oiled. Here again the Tokarev pistol is outstanding. By means of a slide sub-assembly all moving parts are readily available for field cleaning.

A pistol, built as outlined, would possess the following desirable characteristics: maximum reliability; maximum defensive stopping power; maximum speed on the first shot from a safe condition; large magazine capacity; improved ease of maintenance and cleaning, and possibly superior handling and pointing characteristics. It certainly would be superior to any sidearm manufactured as of the present date as a weapon of self-defense for military personnel.

One thing that interested me particularly about Maj Nihart's article was his reference to a small bore pistol's "sufficient" shock power. I confess I don't know what is meant here. Short of a Third Avenue taxicab, very few weapons can guarantee to render an enemy harmless with one blow every time, and this is the only definition of "sufficient" shock power I can think of. Of course some weapons approach this ideal closer than others — the battle axe or mace in the hands of a strong man was probably almost perfect —but practical military firearms do not give 100 per cent or even 75 per cent performance in this respect. Anyone who believes the old theory about a .45 bullet's "knocking a man off his feet wherever it hit him" should try out the weapon on jackrabbits or marmots.



This does not mean that we should abandon the idea of "stopping" or "shocking" power in sidearms. On the contrary we should endeavor to use as much as is practically possible, certainly not decrease it. The word "practically" is where Maj Nihart presumably takes issue. In this he follows the current thinking of the British army, whose claim is that a man hit with a .38 is much less dangerous than a man missed with a .45, and since they believe it easier to train the average recruit to hit with the lighter gun, they have switched from the excellent, if somewhat cumbersome, .455 Webley revolver, to the newer .380 revolver which is similar to the .38 Colt "Super Police."

Carrying this theory to its extreme would result in the adoption of the .22 rim fire as a service cartridge—anyone can hit with that. The point where maximum effectiveness with minimum effort is reached is impossible to determine accurately, but I firmly believe that the slight extra effort involved in mastering the large caliber sidearm for practical, high-speed, defensive shooting, is more than compensated for by the greatly increased shock power it provides.

Gen Julian Hatcher, USA, in his excellent work *Textbook of Pistols and Revolvers* sets up a system for calculation of the "stopping power" of various pistol cartridges, based on momentum and modified by a caliber factor and a bullet shape and material factor, using various standard loads as the basis for a system of coefficients.

This system has been applied to the various cartridges listed in the table of relative stopping power which accompanies this article. It will be seen that there is a very good reason for retaining the .45 A.C.P. cartridge, *which has the highest rating of any load using a legal military bullet.*

In the range of pistol velocities (700-1400 f/s) very considerable changes must be made in speed to produce a decisive change in shock power. Thus, increasing the speed of the service cartridge to the safe limit of the weapon only increases its stopping power by 8½ points, while changing the shape and material of the bullet, with no change in velocity, steps up its effectiveness 23½ points, or some 35 per cent.

Hence it is clear that in providing a small caliber weapon which can equal the service cartridge in stopping power means such a drastic increase in velocity that the weapon will be just as hard to shoot as the bigger gun, if not harder. The perfect illustration is the .357 magnum, which incidentally derives much of its destructive effect in tissue from its "Keith" type bullet which is illegal in military circles.

A glance at the table will show that a reduction in cartridge power from the .45 service cartridge to the .38 special police cartridge, cuts the stopping power of the weapon exactly in half, where the weight of the pistol has been decreased by perhaps a fourth. The pistol being a defensive weapon, a man does not want to toy around when he is faced with instantaneous mortal combat. I personally would rather carry a slightly heavier weapon in all cases, if I could double the wallop it would provide me.

We have a good pistol. It could be considerably improved but an improved model will give no better field service if we continue to train as we do now. I believe that the sidearm's efficiency will never be realized until we cease discouraging a recruit with bull's-eyes and start showing him how to defend himself in an efficient manner.

As an example take the current pistol qualification course or the NRA course. In either case a mediocre rifle shot could pick up a carbine and shoot near possibles every time. This would lead us to believe that we only carry a pistol because there aren't enough two-handed weapons to go around, since the latter is so much more efficient as a weapon.

This thesis is of course not true—there being quite a few situations in which the pistol meets requirements more satisfactorily than any other weapon. In running ten "combat reaction" courses at Camp Pendleton, it was found that a practical shot could consistently outpoint the rifle and carbine users due to the superior speed and handiness of his weapon.

It is impossible here to describe a complete course of training designed to emphasize the merits of the weapon and develop efficient, practical shots. Several law enforcement agencies now have such courses well worked out for the revolver. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has pioneered in this field and the Kansas City Police Department has developed a fine course of its own. It is high time the military forces of the nation adopted similar methods if they intend to retain the pistol at all. This type of training is admittedly a little more expensive and somewhat more dangerous (most strings start with the weapon in the holster), but results are what count and *it brings results.*

In closing this discussion I would like to dwell for a few moments on the subject of holsters. Maj Nihart referred to a suitable holster which would presumably combine security with speed. Unfortunately these two characteristics are antithetical. If a holster is fast, it cannot offer adequate protection or security against jolting out. On the other hand, if it does offer such security and protection from the weather the weapon cannot be reached in time to be of any value in an emergency.

One solution to this problem is the commercial spring holster illustrated. This is the arrangement used for the tests previously described. It offers a large degree of protection, considerable speed, good security against jolting or knocking the weapon out, and another point—comfort. It can be worn longer with less fatigue than any other type, due to its two point suspension and

"Stopping Power"

Based on Hatcher system of momentum modified by cross-sectional area and coefficient of shape and material.

$$\text{Momentum} = \frac{\text{Weight in grains}}{7000} \div 32.16 \times \text{velocity}$$

	Cartridge	R.S.P.	Remarks
1	7.62mm Russian Pistol	17.7	Also SMG
2	9mm Parabellum (Luger)	29.4	P-38, C-35, Sten, etc.
3	.38 Special (Standard V)	30.8*	Standard U.S. Police Cartridge
4	Super .38 Auto	31.8	
5	.38/44 Spec H.V. (Keith Bullet)	49.2	This is the most you can get out of a standard .38
6	.30 U.S. Carbine	54.7	
7	.45 U.S. Auto Pistol	60.0	Standard velocity, Military bullet
8	.455 British Revolver	62.8*	Lead bullet
9	.357 Magnum (Keith Bullet)	67.9	
10	.45 U.S. Auto Pistol (Super X)	68.5	Standard bullet increased to 940 F/S
11	.45 Colt Revolver (Standard velocity)	73.6*	This is the old Western "peacemaker"
12	.45 U.S. Auto Pistol (Keith Bullet)	83.5	Standard velocity
13	.45 Colt Revolver, H.V.	87.4*	"Peacemaker" stepped up to 910 F/S

All calculations are based on muzzle performance.

All cartridges except .30 carbine are here recorded as fired from pistols (4" to 5"). The 7.62mm Russian, 9mm Parabellum, Super .38, and .45 Auto would show somewhat better performance when fired from S.M.G.'s or machine pistols.

These figures bear no relationship to range, accuracy or penetration.

*A plain lead, unjacketed bullet was at one time considered legal in war, but during World War II several powers arbitrarily classified them as unlawful and this ruling seems to have become accepted.

The spring type shoulder holster. A commercial holster, it offers a large degree of protection, considerable speed, good security against jolting or knocking the weapon out, and comfort. In drawing, the hand hits well up on the grip, the gun is pulled forward, while the right thumb unlocks safety.

large supporting surface. It also carries the weapon where it can be rapidly and conveniently drawn from a sitting position, as in a vehicle or behind a desk.

In summary, then, I'd like to reiterate the following points:

1. The pistol is *not* a substitute rifle. It is a weapon of definite characteristics which should be exploited more fully.

2. Our present service pistol, while not perfect, is better than any other current weapon for our purposes and is capable of very much higher performance in the hands of an ordinary shot—if he is trained along more practical lines.

3. Rather than changing the weapon, we should completely revise the training and the competitive courses, profiting by the example of the FBI.

4. A new method of carrying the pistol should be adopted.

5. The two-gun concept is unsound.

The above conglomeration of ideas is mostly my own, though much has been learned from the writings of Gen Hatcher, Maj Charles Askins, and the very helpful staff of the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia.

The shooting mentioned is that of an average shot, capable of making expert with considerable effort, but definitely not in the competitive category. It is this that convinces me that we are not getting the most out of our sidearm, and that this is a mistake that can be remedied with comparative ease. US MC

A NEW lightweight sleeping bag for use in cold, wet climates and a new squad shelter tent housing 12 men are among the latest subjects of experiments by the Army Quartermaster Corps.

The sleeping bag weighs 7½ lbs and consists of layers of resin-coated nylon separated by fibreglass insulation. The outer layer of the newly developed bag prevents moisture from entering, while the inner layer, next to the occupant, overcomes the chilling effects of body vapor.

The new shelter tent is revolutionary in design, employing no center poles, ropes or stakes. It is 16 feet wide, 32 feet in length, 8 feet high at the ridge and 6 feet high at the eaves. The frame is made of steel sections which fold and nest together. The roof is of corrugated sheet aluminum which can be nested for packing.

In Brief...

Occupation troops in Japan are planning to stage a mock invasion, on 1 October, based on the one planned for the taking of the Japanese home islands prior to their surrender. The operation, which is part of an amphibious training program being conducted by occupation forces, will be complete with everything except the real fireworks.

Flame-thrower armed marines recently came to the aid of the Chinese in their battle against one of their oldest and most vicious foes—the locust. The insects, which threatened 60,000 tons of food crops in the Peiping-Tientsin area, approached in five columns, one of which was reported to be two miles long.

A MarCorps dispatch states that all USMC and USMC-SS-V who have a year or more time on current enlistments and have no previous sea or foreign duty are eligible for transfer overseas. Other regulars who have completed six months, excluding hospitalization, in the States since last time overseas are also eligible.

An article in TIME *magazine reveals that the Russians are importing American tunes these days. One of the strangest importations from the West has been the "Marines' Hymn" sung to the tune of "Clementine." Which, says* TIME, *might give the Russians a dangerously erroneous idea of the Leathernecks.*

Twenty-one Naval Air Stations have begun part time refresher training of thousands of pilots, ground officers, and enlisted men under the new Naval Air Reserve program—the first postwar activity to start functioning. The Ready Reserve will be organized into air groups, squadrons, and other units and maintained on a readiness basis.

Enlisted personnel restored to active duty on probation, violation of which resulting in a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge, will not have to serve more than six months if eligible for discharge on or before that time. If probation is for less than six months, personnel otherwise eligible will be discharged at end of probation period.

Camp Elliot, California, a major Marine Corps base during the war, has been turned over to the War Assets Administration for disposal. Once housing more than 16,000 men, Camp Elliot was well known to West Coast Marines, first as a training site and later as a separation center. Its 452 buildings are spread out over 28,900 acres.

Headquarters Marine Corps has directed in a letter of instruction that preparation of individual warrants and appointments will be resumed. As soon as the warrants and appointments become available, commanding officers will issue individual noncommissioned officer warrants and sixth pay grade appointments.

The Division of Aviation reports that there were 573 Marine planes lost in actual combat between 7 December 1941 and 17 August 1945. During the same period Marine airmen shot down a total of 2,381 Japanese aircraft. These include the eight enemy aircraft bagged by our forces during the defense of Wake Island.

Britain's Royal Marines suffered losses of 7,524 men killed and wounded during World War II. Of these 178 officers were killed or are still missing while 239 officers were wounded. Enlisted men killed or missing number 3,789 while another 3,388 men were wounded. Wartime strength of the Corps was 3,249 officers and 73,894 enlisted.

The lowest occupation force ratio in the world —one for each 400 inhabitants—occupies Japan. Combined U.S. and British Commonwealth forces total 190,000 in a population of 75 million. The U.S. zone of Korea is second lowest with .3 percent while the highest percentage of occupation forces is the Russian zone of Austria with 6.6 percent.

The Veterans Administration has temporarily liberalized regulations governing reinstatement of National Service Life Insurance. This enables many veterans, including those with disabilities who might have trouble getting other insurance, to recover their insurance protection providing their health has not grown worse.

Discharges "for the convenience of the government to accept permanent appointment to officer rank in the Regular Marine Corps" has been authorized for all present temporary officers whose permanent status is that of enlisted men in the Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve. Mustering out pay will be given to those entitled to it.

The Closer The Better

By LtCol Lewis W. Walt

The work of VMF-114 in clearing the beachhead and a pocket of resistance on Peleliu, prove the advantage of close air support to the infantry



VMF Squadron 114 arrived on Peleliu on 26 September 1944—eleven days after the assault landing by the 1st Marine Division—with the primary mission of protecting Peleliu and Angaur from hostile air attacks and of harassing the enemy in the northern Palaus, and with the secondary mission of furnishing close air support to the infantry units operating in the Peleliu Area.

The following day, 27 September, the squadron was called upon to support the landing of the 3d Bn, Fifth Marines (reinforced) on the enemy-held island of Ngesebus. This was a shore-to-shore operation with approximately five hundred yards of water (not over 4 feet in depth at low tide) to be crossed by the assaulting troops who were in position at the northern end of Peleliu. VMF-114 was operating from the Peleliu airfield, approximately three miles from Ngesebus. The landing was to be supported by warships, planes, and division artillery, in addition to Sherman tanks, LVTs and other supporting weapons attached to RCT 5.

The preliminary bombardment in preparation for the attack on Ngesebus was begun by supporting warships at 0600. Their shelling continued until 0800. From 0700-0800 it was supplemented by fire from the division artillery regiment. At 0800 all gunfire ceased and the softening up job was turned over to VMF-114 for 30 minutes. The Corsairs worked the island over from end to end by alternately strafing and bombing all suspected enemy strongpoints.

At 0830, the planes cleared the area around Ngesebus and for 20 minutes, 0830 to 0850, a heavy concentration of ship's gunfire, artillery, and mortars was brought down on the island. The ships' gunfire was brought to bear mainly on the high ground in the center and on the west end of the island while the artillery and mortars concentrated on the landing beach just opposite Peleliu.

The last ten minutes prior to H-Hour was reserved for VMF-114. It had orders to fly parallel to the landing beach and to strafe it as heavily and accurately as possible until H-Hour. During this ten minutes, the Sherman tanks and LVTAs, forming the first wave, were to be moving from the Peleliu shore to the landing beach. The 2d, 3d, and 4th waves made up of LVTs loaded with the assault troops were to follow at five minute intervals. The first two Sherman tanks encountered trouble at the time of departure which resulted in the first wave hitting at H plus 13.

In their strafing of the landing beach the planes of squadron VMF-114 left nothing to be desired. The planes came in fast and most of them were not more than 50 feet above the beach. Their strafing was extremely accurate, and, according to a prisoner captured in the

beach defenses, "the most terrifying and effective of any of the preparation fires on the beach." Had the initial wave of tanks and LVTAs arrived on the beach as scheduled at H-Hour, just as the planes ceased strafing, and continued the fire on to the beach by use of their 75mm guns and machine guns, the operation would have been perfectly executed. As it was, a few of the enemy in the beach defenses recovered sufficiently from the effects of the strafing to open fire on our assault waves until silenced by fire from the tanks and LVTAs as they approached the beach.

As demonstrated, aircraft support is most effective during those last few minutes before the initial wave of an assault landing force hits the beach. It is a known fact that all ships gunfire and artillery fire, in case the landing is one that can be supported by artillery, must be lifted off the landing beach when the leading wave is from 200 to 400 yards offshore, due to the danger of "short rounds" falling on our own troops. The same requirement is true of aircraft, *not trained* in close support tactics, which tries to strafe, bomb or fire rockets on the beach from a thousand feet in the air and aproaching from any or all directions. On the other hand, if the air unit is sufficiently trained and will fly at an extremely low altitude parallel to the beach when they deliver their donation to the beach defenders, they can continue this operation, using very accurate rocket and strafing fire until the initial wave is within fifty or seventy-five yards of the beach. If this is done, the enemy has only a few seconds of freedom from the time the supporting fires lift until engaged by the assault waves.

Later in the Peleliu campaign our infantry units became bogged down in their attack against cave-infested high ground, commonly known as the "pocket" in the center of Peleliu just north of the airfield. The "pocket" measured approximately 900 yards by 400 yards and was under attack from all sides by our troops. The attack was progressing very slowly and with heavy casualties to the assault troops. All supporting arms except naval gunfire and aircraft were used on the "pocket" from the start of the operation against it, by assault troops. On 30 September as a result of the outstanding performance it had displayed on the Ngesebus landing, VMF Squadron 114 was again called upon to carry out a mission of close support where extreme accuracy and precision were required if their mission was to be carried out successfully or even with safety to our own troops.

With our infantry units attacking on all sides of the "pocket," this squadron was given the mission of dropping twenty 1000-pound bombs in a target area of about 100 yards square in the center of the pocket. This area contained high coral ridges and deep gulleys honeycombed with caves which the enemy was using as his headquarters. For this operation very close liaison between the infantry and air units was essential.

Marine machine gunners and artillerymen with this flat view could not pick and choose targets while the Japanese holed up in caves in the Peleliu pocket . . .

but Corsairs of VMF-114 equipped with 1,000-pounders and Napalm drove the Japs deep into the earth, stripped away their camouflage, left them open to observation.

Every member of the squadron was briefed in every detail of the terrain and friendly troop location. The infantry and squadron commander flew over the area together in a joint reconnaissance to make sure the target was identified. When the bombing run began, the front line infantry units set off colored hand grenades to mark their lines. The squadron carried out its mission at the appointed time and with an accuracy which we in the infantry formerly believed impossible.

On 8 October VMF Squadron 114 was again called upon to drop 1000-pound bombs on a target in the "pocket." This time, quoting the 1st Marine Division Special Action Report, "A total of 35 bombs were dropped on the target with extreme accuracy." On 9 October, the enemy was again given the 1000-pound bomb treatment with a total of 12 bombs, all hitting the target area. On 13 October, this same squadron was called upon to support our infantry action with another type of deadly weapon, the Napalm bomb. By this time the pocket had shrunk in size, due to front line advances, to an area approximately 600 yards in length and 300 yards in width. The Napalm bomb was a source of real worry to the aviators, who, up to this time, had gained the fullest confidence of the attacking troops by their expert performance in dropping the 1000 pounders. Dropping the Napalm bombs on a small area or point target surrounded by friendly troops, presented a more difficult problem. The Napalm bombs were made by filling spare belly tanks with a Napalm and gasoline mixture and fusing them with contact fuses. They were carried on the underside of the fuselage by the same rack that carried the regular belly tanks. The biggest drawback to this means of carrying the bombs was the release mechanism, which was not of the precision release type and could not be depended on to release the bomb at the instant it was tripped. As a precaution against undue casualties among our own troops during the bombing, all of the attacking troops, except a skeleton holding force, were withdrawn from the north side of the pocket. The planes made their run from south to north with the assigned mission of dropping their bombs in the deep ravines and sharp coral ridges in the center of the "pocket." By this time all the aviators were very familiar with the "pocket" terrain and little difficulty was encountered in pointing out the targets to them. On the 13th and 14th a total of 36 bombs were dropped, and the division special action report carried this comment, "Bombing was excellent, air and ground coordinating perfectly." According to the record only three of the 36 Napalm bombs failed to hit the target. All three were "hung bombs." Two of them were dropped on the north edge of the pocket without causing any casualties to our widely dispersed and well dug-in troops and the third was dropped in the ocean some distance from the island.

It is hard to definitely evaluate the effect of this bombing in the "pocket" area, but it can be stated that it was one of the most effective weapons we were able to use. It hit the enemy from

Close Air Support Defined

CLOSE air support may be defined as that direct support given by aircraft to front line infantry units which are in combat with the enemy. This support is normally in the form of strafing, rocket firing, or the dropping of demolition, personnel, or fire bombs on the enemy troops and materiel which are in immediate contact with our assault units.

The purpose of close air support is identical to the purpose of close support by any other supporting weapon. It is to destroy enemy personnel, emplacements or materiel which may be holding up the advance of our infantry or causing casualties to our assault troops by direct flanking or enfilade fire from a dominating terrain feature or from a protected firing position to our front or flank. Close air support is particularly effective on the latter type of enemy defense. The vertical attack, or even the angular attack from the front, made by planes on the enemy reverse slope, or otherwise defiladed positions, was often times the only means available of destroying these well-protected enemy positions in the recent war.

Another instance in which close air support by well-trained aircraft units should have advantages over other types of close support is in the support of the initial assault waves of an amphibious landing against strong beach defenses. This type of close support to be effective requires planes to come down as close as possible to the beach. Their strafing, rocket firing, and bombing must be extremely accurate so as not to endanger the initial assault wave, approaching the beach under cover of the aircrafts' bombardment. It is a daring and dangerous assignment for the aviator but if done properly, its effects on the enemy defenses far outweighs the chances taken and can not be duplicated by any other of our supporting arms.

his only vulnerable direction. It killed all who were not in caves, and, last but not least, it destroyed his camouflage and stripped his fortress of any protecting vegetation. Without this close air support, the operation against the pocket would have been longer and more costly.

The terrain was extremely rough and precipitous. There were numerous small terrain corridors and compartments bounded on all sides by vertical coral cliffs which were honeycombed with caves and other enemy fortifications. Any fire delivered into these vertically-walled strongholds by our ground supporting weapons was practically unobserved from our ground OP's, and could not be observed accurately by observation planes because they were unable to be directly over the target during the firing. Besides this weakness of our ground supporting weapons, their fire also always descended on the target at an angle which made impossible the task of thoroughly covering all sections of a small compartment or corridor with perpendicular sides.

For our support aircraft, this type of target was relatively simple to hit. Not only could they deliver much larger loads of destruction on the enemy than our ground supporting weapons, but they had good observation of the target area and could drop their bombs in every corner of the coral compartments. It gave the enemy no alternative but to retreat deep into his cave fortifications in order to escape the terrific concussion and heat of the demolition and Napalm bombs. It was impossible to determine the number of enemy destroyed by this air action. However, aside from his casualties, it must have been very demoralizing to him when he realized that he was not immune to attack from any direction, and that after each attack his terrain was made more naked and more vulnerable to the eyes of our observers who were ever searching for his concealed positions.

With reference to future successful employment of aircraft as a close support weapon for infantry units, the most important consideration, as in any form of tactics, is training. One of the first and most basic steps in this training should be a thorough indoctrination of the aviators in the basic tactics of infantry units. Until an aviator understands how ground troops operate in an attack against the enemy and until he becomes familiar with the infantryman's language in describing the location and employment of front line troops, he cannot be efficient and accurate in furnishing close air support.

It is just as important that infantry officers be fully instructed in the capabilities and limitations of the aircraft as a supporting weapon.

The air-infantry team, like the tank-infantry and the artillery-infantry team, takes the highest degree of understanding and coordination in order to be successful. USMC

THE FRENCH ARSENAL



By Lt Jeff Binda

A FEW HOURS' march east of Tientsin there is an old ashen-gray arsenal sprawled out on a Chinese plain, and the stories that are told about this grim hoary fortress are reminiscent of the days of the old-world colonial outposts and the French Foreign Legion. Its history, like something out of "Beau Geste" or "Lives of a Bengal Lancer," begins back during the last part of the 19th Century. And not a few old European families in Tientsin still shudder in recalling the days of the Boxer Rebellion when China was rife with secret and fanatical societies.

After the Japanese victory over China in 1895, Russia, Germany, and France began to intervene in China to limit the territorial encroachments of Japan. In 1899 the American policy of the Open Door delayed, perhaps, the world process of slicing China up into colonial possessions. But by now the Chinese people were bewildered by the territorial claims of foreign nations; China was resentful. The peasants rebelled. The Manchus, in order to escape the swelling passion of the insurgents, blamed all the sufferings of China on the "foreign devils." And so there was fomented the Boxer Rebellion. And China was soon invaded by international forces to suppress this rebellion.

At this time the Grand Arsenal, originally built as an arms and munitions factory for the province of Hopei, was occupied by 3,000 Chinese in revolt. On the day this story begins, these Chinese with their many Krupp cannons were pouring devastating artillery barrages on the European concessions in Tientsin.

At dawn on the 27th of June, 1900, the attack on the Arsenal commenced. Russian troops moved up from Taku harbor, while at the same time French and British troops pressed the Boxers in the Tientsin area from the south. There was an intense bombardment all morning, followed by an infantry assault at 1230. An hour later the objective was attained. Eight hundred Chinese were left dead on the field; arms and ammunition were abandoned; the Arsenal was in the hands of the Allies. With 45 men "hors de combat," the Allied troops returned to Tien-

Occupied by four countries since 1900, Grand Arsenal is a Chinese Alamo

tsin that evening, leaving a Russian detachment to guard the conquered position.

Thus began what was to be the first of four occupancies of the Grand Arsenal by four nations in the next 40-odd years. Russian garrison forces remained at the Arsenal for a year and a half, making few, if any, changes or improvements within the compound. Late in 1901 Russia, anxious for the ownership of a tract of land in the possession of the French, effected a trade with the French Government for property in Tientsin in exchange for the Grand Arsenal.

On 5 May 1903, after the draining of the marshes and the work of reclamation was completed, the first and second companies of the 16th French Colonial Infantry Regiment were installed at the Arsenal.

Within the compound were seven or eight huge smoke stacks for foundries, several large underground canals and many buildings unserviceable in general for military use. But with the help of Chinese labor, large scale construction work was undertaken. Old buildings were torn down, gradually to be replaced by new brick buildings; the old stone wall, built around the Arsenal by the Chinese, was sold stone by stone to alleviate financial problems, since the French Government was unable, or unwilling, to render assistance; and before too many years had passed, a colonial fortress had mushroomed to life. By 1937, 12,000 troops were quartered within the Arsenal—French Infantry, Marine Infantry, Cavalry Regiments from Africa, and the Foreign Legion.

And so from 1903 until 1945 the Grand Arsenal remained a picturesque French colonial outpost, through and beyond the lean years that led ultimately to the debacle of France. French troops were paid from money procured by selling supplies to Japanese in French Indo-China, since no financial aid was provided by either the Vichy or Free French government. It has been asserted that the French military forces in Tientsin were sympathetic, however, toward the Free French but that difficult circumstances prevented their swearing open allegiance to DeGaulle.

The Japanese seized the Grand Arsenal early in May, 1945, after an "incident" had occurred in Indo-China between French and Japanese forces. But not a shot was fired in Tientsin. The French detachment withdrew to the Contal Barracks in the city, and for the next five months the Japanese occupied the fortress; that is, until the arrival of the U. S. Marines.

At the present time the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, commanded by MajGen Louis E. Woods, is located out at this old French Arsenal; the friendly hum of Gen Woods' planes whirring overhead daily out here is a far cry from that morning in June 1900, when perhaps the fate of the Boxer Rebellion was decided in Tientsin out at the Grand Arsenal. USMC

Roman Marines

THE first use of marines of any historical importance occurred during the Punic wars. There were three of these wars waged between the young Roman Republic, of which Rome was the center, and Carthage, located in what is now Tunis, North Africa. The first war lasted from 265 B.C., to 241 B.C. In the first stage of this war, the Carthaginians, who were experienced seamen, defeated the Roman navy every time they met, and succeeded in completely destroying it. The Romans then proceeded to build an entirely new navy, and, in addition they selected some of their best legionary soldiers and trained them for special fighting on board ship. They then went after the Carthaginian navy, destroyed it and secured control of the entire Mediterranean. The Carthaginians were driven off the sea.

The Roman navy never after that suffered defeat. It continued to maintain its control of the Mediterranean until the downfall of Rome.

During the time of Pompey and Caesar about 50 B.C., pirates in the Mediterranean became so strong that Rome was in danger of being starved out. Supplies could not be obtained to feed the Roman people. These were days of racketeering on a large scale. The Roman general, Pompey, reorganized the navy, increased the number of soldiers attached to the fleet, and improved their efficiency by training, and then destroyed the pirates after some hard fighting. But he had to increase his force of marines to do it.—Col Edward A. Greene (Ret)

The Development of AMPHIBIOUS TACTICS in the U.S. Navy

By LtGen H. M. Smith

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 1

SOON AFTER the formation of the Fleet Marine Force, the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet approved a general plan for training it in landing operations in the Carribbean. The Chief of Naval Operations authorized RearAdm C. S. Freeman, Commander of the Special Service Squadron, to command an experimental problem involving a landing attack by the Fleet Marine Force embarked on the vessels of the Special Service Squadron. This Squadron, which was at sea for continuous practical service, was considered to be the fleet unit most interested in landing force operations. The training came within the province of the Training Squadron of the Scouting Force and consequently the Training Squadron and the Fleet Marine Force were placed under the Special Service Squadron for the purposes of the problem. The Training Squadron consisted of the *Arkansas* and *Wyoming* and Destroyer Squadron Ten. The northwest peninsula of Culebra Island was chosen as the training area. In December 1934, a conference between BrigGen C. H. Lyman of the Fleet Marine Force and Adm C. S. Freeman was held aboard the Special Service Squadron flagship *Trenton* at St. Petersburg, Florida, to formulate plans for this training.

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 1 was conducted during the period 21 January to 8 March 1935. In addition to the *Trenton*, the following ships participated in the exercise: the *Taylor*, *Claxton*, *Woodcock*, the *Arkansas*, flagship of Adm Ellis, Commander Training Squadron, which was used to transport 37 officers and 554 enlisted marines of the landing force, the *Wyoming* which carried 30 officers and 552 enlisted men, and the *Antares*, a general transport and supply ship, scheduled for decommissioning, which had 24 officers and 379 men embarked. The landing force under the command of Gen Lyman included 91 officers and 1476 enlisted men and consisted of Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, the 5th Marine Regiment less one battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 10th Marine Artillery Regiment equipped with 155mm guns, 75mm pack howitzers, 50 caliber antiaircraft guns, and one squadron of Aircraft One. The total baggage, equipment, and motor transport of the landing force was limited to 258 tons.

The actual exercises began at Culebra on 28 January and lasted for a month. They involved the daily landing of troops for training ashore and included the tactical landing of a reinforced regiment and the establishing of artillery and aviation ashore for the defense of a Fleet base. A battalion of the Fleet Marine Force which had been assigned to the Commander, Special Service Squadron, for emergency employment was attached to the 5th Marines and constituted the third infantry battalion. The ship-to-shore movement was practiced in regular ships' boats which included four 50-foot motor launches (capacity 110 men), six 40-foot motor launches (capacity 50 men), two 36-foot motor launches (capacity 38 men), five 26-foot motor whaleboats (capacity 12 men), one 50-foot motor launch with a boat rig "A" and a ramp, a device contrived to transport artillery and vehicles on the gunwales of the small boats and to land them by ramps, and one towed artillery lighter. Shore bombardment training during Fleet Landing Exercise No. 1 consisted of counterbattery, harassing, neutralization, and interdiction fires at long range. Indirect fire was controlled by air spot and shore observation. This gunfire training was handicapped by many artificialities. No actual firing was conducted in support of troops but the value of various types of ammunition against shore installations was tested in actual firing at dummy targets. Experiments were made to determine the destructive and anti-personnel effects of naval ordnance, the effect of gunfire on reverse slopes and the particular missions for which given caliber projectiles and fuses were best suited. Practices were conducted in firing small arms and mortars from landing boats in the approach. Actual strafing, bombing, and smoke missions

Part IV: training, experiment, six Fleet Landing Exercises—1934-1941

were conducted by airplanes in support of the troops during the training exercises. Field artillery training was conducted separately and not in coordination with infantry. The emphasis was on field training ashore rather than on the problems of ship-to-shore assault and troops were daily disembarked into small boats by gangways. It was recommended, however, that the experimental cargo net method of debarkation for troops be adopted as standard. Reports also indicated a need for greater numbers of landing boats for training. Five Army officers observed this first practical test of the new landing operations doctrine. The exercise was considered to be a success and to warrant a continuance of this training on an annual basis.

Fleet Marine Force units on the West Coast participated between 29 April and 12 June 1935 in United States Fleet Problem XVI. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, and seven officers of the Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, together with Headquarters, 6th Marine Regiment, and one infantry battalion of the 6th Marines, the 2d Battalion, 10th Marine Artillery Regiment (2 batteries of 75mm pack howitzers), and Aircraft Two, operating from the *USS Langley,* participated in landing operations, and the establishment of a base on Midway Island between 11 and 23 May.

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 2

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 2 was conducted under RearAdm Hayne Ellis, Commander Training Squadron, during the period 4 January to 24 February 1936. The ships participating included the *Arkansas, Wyoming, Claxton, Taylor, Antares, and Woodcock.* RearAdm George J. Meyers, Commander Special Service Squadron, was present during the exercise with the *Memphis, Manely* and *Fairfax,* but did not participate. During 1935, Fleet Marine Force Headquarters had moved from Quantico to San Diego. However, the Commanding General and members of his staff were present to observe the operations at Culebra. The landing force for Fleet Landing Exercise No. 2 consisted of the 1st Marine Brigade under Col James Meade and included Brigade Headquarters, the 5th Marine Regiment less one battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 10th Marine Artillery Regiment containing two batteries of 75mm pack howitzers, one battalion of base defense artillery, which included a 155mm gun section and a 50 caliber anti-aircraft section, the Brigade Chemical Company and the Brigade Engineer Company. Aircraft One, including observation, fighting, and bombing squadrons, also participated and conducted extensive experiments in various types of aircraft missions, including the dropping of flares and bombing of underwater obstacles. The landing force, totalling 99 officers and 1686 enlisted troops, remained aboard ship at night and conducted daily landings and field exercises ashore. The training included an umpired one-sided maneuver involving an assault landing and the evacuation of casualties. Artillery, engineer and aviation elements were established ashore and participated in all exercises. Standard ships' boats were again used for the landing, and there were four 50-foot, six 40-foot, and two 36-foot motor launches available in addition to nine motor whaleboats and two motor boats. Experiments were made in firing boat guns in the landing. Guns and mortars were found to be the most effective weapons for this mission. More emphasis was placed on ship-to-shore training, which included landings through mangroves, but extensive field training including combat firing of all weapons ashore continued to be the principal activity of the landing force.

As a result of the exercise, it was reported that combatant naval vessels were not suited for use as transports because they were unable to carry a sufficient number of landing boats and the space available for troops was limited. Accordingly, it was recommended that assault transports be provided for the Fleet Marine Force. This recommendation was continuously reiterated, but it was not until 1941 that such vessels became available for use in landing exercises. The need was also recognized for a fast, maneuverable, well-protected landing boat. The 1st Marine Brigade was understrength in personnel and equipment and the addition of another infantry regiment and more artillery was strongly recommended. A special gridded map was employed for designating naval gunfire targets. Air spot was effectively employed for indirect fire missions, and high explosive projectiles were found to be preferable to armor piercing ordnance for shore bombardment. Extensive tests were conducted in the firing of 12-inch guns against shore targets. It was also recommended that aircraft carriers be made available for landing exercises. Twenty United States Army officers were present as observers for the training period.

The 2nd Marine Brigade on the West Coast conducted training with the Fleet during the period 14 November to 16 November at San Clements Island.

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 3

The following year the annual problem was conducted on the West Coast in the San Clements and San Pedro areas between 27 January and 10 March 1937, and included both the San Diego and Quantico elements of the Fleet Marine Force as well as an Army contingent. The exercises were under the over-all command of RearAdm W. T. Tarrant, Commander Scouting Force. The

following units participated in Fleet Landing Exercise No. 3: the *Wyoming*, *New York*, Battleship Division One plus the *Nevada*, Cruiser Division Four less the *Salt Lake City*, Cruiser Division Five less the *Chicago* plus the *Louisville*, Destroyer Division Eight and the following transports: *Utah*, *Bridge*, *Holland*, *Antares*, and the United States Army Transport *St. Mihiel*. The maneuver was a joint problem. The 1st Expeditionary Brigade, United States Army, including the 40th Infantry Regiment, joined the Fleet Marine Force for landing exercises. The 1st and 2nd Marine Brigades were under the command of BrigGen D. C. McDougal. The 1st Brigade less artillery detachments, which were left at Quantico, embarked aboard ship on 6 January for movement to the West Coast, and 52 planes of Aircraft One flew to North Island to join Aircraft Two. There were a total of 251 officers and 2479 enlisted men of the Marine Corps, and 61 officers and 731 enlisted men of the Army involved in the training. RearAdm Wilson Brown commanded the training detachment of the Scouting Force. Landing exercises were conducted between 30 January and 18 February at San Clements. Little motor transport or heavy equipment was embarked in view of the limited size of the objective. However, there were ample landing boats available because of the large number of ships participating. Fourteen 50-foot motor launches, twenty-eight 40-foot motor launches, two 40-foot motor whaleboats, five 36-foot motor launches, two 33-foot motor launches, six 30-foot motor launches, five 16-foot dinghies, 25 wherries, and, for the first time, three experimental boats were employed for the ship-to-shore movement. Minor landing exercises were held for all units both at night and during the day. All weapons were combat fired, and a shore bombardment in support of attacking troops was actually executed for the first time in a fleet landing exercise. Parachute drops were also included in the maneuvers. As a result of prevailing bad weather, boat crews received valuable training in maneuvering through the heavy surf. The results of comparative tests of landing craft showed that the 40-foot motor launch was the best standard boat available. The real need for fast, maneuverable, surf-riding landing craft was again clearly indicated, and valuable recommendations were contributed for the development of special craft as a result of the exercises. The need for careful joint training of all individals and small units in the fundamental techniques of embarkation and debarkation prior to combined training and participation in full-scale landings was also demonstrated. The second series of landing exercises at San Pedro were hampered by bad weather and only one landing was actually conducted.

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 4

Culebra was again chosen in 1938 as the area for Fleet Landing Exercise No. 4 which was held between 13 January and 15 March. The forces participating were designated "Hepburn Attack Force" and were under the command of Rear Adm A. W. Johnson, Commander Training Squadron. The naval attack force included the *New York*, *Arkansas*, *Wyoming*, *Antares*, Destroyer Squadron Ten (8 destroyers), Submarine Eleven (4 submarines), two Coast Guard cutters, and a naval patrol plane squadron. The landing force was the 1st Marine Brigade under the command of BrigGen R. P. Williams and included Brigade Headquarters, the 5th Marines less one battalion, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, less one battery, Brigade Engineer Company, Brigade Tank Company, which included three light tanks, Brigade Chemical Company and Aircraft One. There were 153 officers and 1200 men in the landing troops of the Brigade. The 2d Provisional United States Army brigade, 42 officers and 547 enlisted men, under the command of Col Brabson, also participated in the maneuvers. This Brigade consisted of the 18th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, and the 1st Engineer Company.

All troops were encamped ashore initially and conducted combat firing and preliminary unit training in anticipation of combined landing exercises. In addition to the usual standard landing boats, four experimental boats, one tank lighter and one artillery lighter were available. The experimental boats lacked armor and reports indicated excessive vibration. However, they were improvements on the landing boats then in use. The tank lighter performed very well, landing its tanks in less than 20 seconds. For the first time troops were transferred from battleships to old type destroyers on skiffs and two infantry companies participated in a rapid surprise landing. The success of this experiment led to the conversion of other destroyers for troop-carrying missions. The advantages of a coordinated daylight attack with full air and naval gunfire support were already considered decisive for major landings.

The second phase of training had three parts. The first was a landing attack against Culebra in which the entire joint landing force, less one battalion of Marine infantry and one battery of artillery, which were used in the defense, landed in an umpired maneuver. The enemy force was represented in part by control flags. Added realism was attained by the interjection of last minute changes in landing beaches and naval gunfire targets. In the second part of the landing exercise phase of training, the landing force, less one reinforced battalion again used in the defense, approached under cover of darkness and landed on beaches on Vieques Island unknown

to the defending force. The third phase was a large umpire-controlled, two-sided maneuver. Two National Guard regiments and one Regular Army regiment under the command of BrigGen W. C. Short was employed to defend the south coast of Puerto Rico against which a landing at- out gunfire support. The success of the final landing on Puerto Rico showed the benefit of prior unit training and rehearsal at Culebra. tack was launched one hour before daylight with- Fleet Landing Exercise No. 4 contained many notable improvements. There was far more realism and less use of constructive forces than had been necessary in the past. Reconnaissance elements were landed. Special landing equipment was tried for the first time. Light tanks were used to destroy defensive obstacles in the landing area. Special motor transportation and litter hoists were tried out in actual shore-to-ship casualty evacuation. Bail loading of landing boats was attempted. And the value of aviation for reconnaissance and photographic missions was clearly established. The need for aircraft carriers to provide aviation support for landing exercises was indicated and so reported. However, the chief deficiency in the Fleet Landing Exercises continued to be the shortage of personnel in the Fleet Marine Force which prevented its functioning as a well-balanced organization and the lack of suitable troop transports.

The Army had detailed officers to observe the landing exercises conducted by the Fleet Marine Force since 1935 and had provided small detachments to participate in the training under the Fleet Marine Force. The growing importance of amphibious tactics led the Chief of Staff of the Army to request of the Chief of Naval Operations that the Army be permitted to participate more fully in amphibious training. Adm William D. Leahy's reply of 11 August 1938 to Gen Malin Craig, Chief of Staff of the Army, stated: "I consider joint operations are of a major type and therefore do not belong in the opening phase of a war. This first, or opening phase, it is believed, will be purely naval in character, involving the seizure of temporary bases in the immediate theater of fleet operations.

"It is essential that naval forces, including the Fleet Marine Force, perfect the doctrines and techniques of such operations."

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5

RearAdm A. W. Johnson, Commander Atlantic Squadron, was again in over-all command for the fifth Fleet Landing Exercise which was held between 13 January and 19 March 1939 at Culebra. The designation "Dewey Attack Force" was given the participating forces and naval elements included the *New York, Wyoming, Arkansas, Texas,* Destroyer Squadron Ten, two Coast Guard cutters, and the *Capella,* a sister ship of the *Antares.* Cruiser Division Eight, Destroyer Division Four, and five submarines joined the participating forces for the final phase. The landing force of 160 officers and 1968 enlisted men was again under the command of BrigGen R. P. Williams and included the 1st Marine Brigade Headquarters, the 5th Marine Regiment less one battalion, the 1st Battalion 10th Marines, and batteries of the 15th Marines, and Brigade chemical, tank, engineer, medical, and aviation units. 20 officers of the United States Marine Corps and 10 officers of the Marine Corps Reserve acted as umpires. The following special landing craft were available for training in addition to regular naval landing boats: 2 tank lighters, 1 artillery lighter and 19 experimental craft of various types including rubber boats. Landings were conducted on both Culebra and Vieques. The logistical aspect of landing operations were stressed with special emphasis on the supply of ammunition and rations. Five light tanks and 81 experimental motor vehicles were tested.

Three main landings were conducted during the training period. In the first, a battalion of infantry, reinforced with a mortar platoon and carrying one unit of fire and twenty-four hours' rations was transferred at sea to six destroyers and landed at night in four waves of landing boats and eighteen skiffs powered with outboard motors. The landing was covered by aircraft and destroyer support. In the second landing, a full-scale attack was launched against Culebra. This was a two-day, one-sided operation which was closely umpired and controlled. On the first day, landings were made on outlying islands and artillery landed with which to support the main attack. On the second day, the entire landing force was put ashore with the coordinated support of artillery, naval gunfire and air. In the third operation, small task groups conducted landings against Vieques, which was defended by a reinforced battalion. This operation was preceded by preliminary reconnaissance and a demonstration. In this two-sided maneuver, problems of supply and evacuation were again stressed. During Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5, there was the usual preliminary field training and combat firing of weapons ashore, and considerable quantities of new equipment, developed as a result of previous fleet landing exerices, were tested.

In five years, substantial advances were made in training methods and in the simplification of orders and of staff functioning. Tactical progress was effected with constantly improved coordination. The basic doctrine was apparently sound. The two major deficiencies which were continually apparent were the lack of transports and of adequate personnel in the Fleet Marine Force.

Fleet Landing Exercise No. 6

The sixth Fleet Landing Exercise, conducted during the period 11 January to 13 March 1940, was the most advanced and realistic maneuver yet attempted. The benefits of previous training and experimentation and the extensive training in landing boats, which had been conducted by the Fleet during 1939, were apparent in the proficiency and coordination which characterized the activity of the participating forces. The advent of war in Europe the previous September gave a new urgency to amphibious training and Fleet Landing Exercise No. 6 was a turning point in the development of landing force tactics. The major deficiencies which continued to exist through 1940 were the lack of transports, the lack of sufficient landing craft, the shortage of personnel, and the limited production schedule for amphibious

RearAdm Hayne Ellis, Commander Atlantic Squadron, commanded the Farragut Attack Force for the maneuver. The naval forces included Battleship Division Five, Cruiser Division Seven less the *Quincy*, Destroyer Squadron Ten and a "transport" group including the *Wyoming*, *Capella*, and *Manley*. Submarine Division Eleven and a naval patrol squadron embarked on the USS *Yukon*. The landing force consisted of the 1st Marine Brigade (151 officers and 2093 enlisted men) and the 1st Marine Air Group and was under the command of BrigGen Holland M. Smith. Troops and 1000 tons of equipment were embarked on the *Texas, New York, Arkansas, Wyoming, San Francisco, Tuscaloosa, Capella*, and *Manley*. Landing craft included two tank lighters, two artillery lighters, twenty-five special landing craft, of which twelve were the Bureau type, and eight landing skiffs. Comparative tests showed the Higgins Eureka landing craft, the 45-foot tank lighters and rubber boats were the best adapted to landing operations.

Training included preliminary field exercises ashore followed by three landing exercises between 15 February and 8 March. In the first landing exercise, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Reinforced, conducted a reconnaissance landing and then organized a defense to oppose the second landing. The second landing was made on Vieques with a company landing from rubber boats at night prior to the main attack and the final one on Culebra. This was also a two-sided exercise. Submarines were used for reconnaissance missions and landing scouts. The destroyer troop transports were again employed with good effect. Landings were opposed by underwater defenses and recommendations for aircraft carriers and transports were reiterated in the reports covering the exercise. Naval gunfire training emphasized control and the capabilities of various types of ammunition.

Summary

The period between 1934 and 1941 was one of application, test, and experimentation in the development of amphibious tactics. The doctrine which had been developed in the preceding fifteen years was put to practical test by the organization for which it had been promulgated, and its efficacy was demonstrated. Organization, weapons, and equipment were scrutinized in actual use, and recommendations were made for new and further developments. Experiments were made with the limited amount of materiel thus developed. Training methods were established. The personnel of the Fleet Marine Force was indoctrinated and trained to carry out its mission as a part of the Fleet. The doctrine was supplemented with the new techniques which evolved in training. They were largely directed at improving the coordination of participating air, ground, and surface elements. Finally, the first six Fleet Landing Exercises resulted in a more widespread interest in amphibious tactics and a general recognition of their complexity in both services.

However, there were certain marked and recognized deficiencies which limited development in amphibious warfare during this period. The limited appropriations for, and therefore the strength of forces available for amphibious training, the shortage of troops in the Fleet Marine Force and the necessity for rotating them, the resulting skeletonized organization of the Fleet Marine Force, the limited number of other Fleet elements available for participation in landing exercises, the view that materiel production should be on an experimental rather than quantity scale, the total lack of assault transport vessels, the very limited number of landing craft, and the view that landing operations required the organization of task forces but that no permanent type organization of transports or amphibious elements was necessary in the Fleet resulted in the following limitations:

1. The necessity to repeat fundamental training each year.
2. The resulting handicap to a progressive program over a period of several years.
3. The training of leaders and key personnel but the inability to maintain a permanently organized, full strength, trained tactical unit of any but the most limited size for actual employment in war.
4. The general limitation of tactics by, and the development of tactics for, the means available rather than the development of weapons and equipment to meet tactical requirements.
5. The lack of trained landing craft and transport personnel.
6. The lack of realism in training.

To be Continued

THE MARINE CORPS'

By Capt Phillip N. Pierce

TO THE CASUAL observer, the marines who lined the starboard rail of the transport, outward bound for Samoa from San Diego on an April morning in 1942, looked like any other marines. Watching the heights of Point Loma slide slowly astern, it is doubtful that many of them were aware that among their group were two for whom the fates that decide such things had reserved a time-honoured distinction for marines—that of being "first" again. It is just as doubtful that such knowledge would have made a very great impression on them at the time.

Standing among the group at the rail were Capt John W. Thomason III and Sgt Richard T. Wright, news reporters of a type new to U.S. journalism — combat correspondents. To them had gone the honor of being the forerunners of a group of ex-newspapermen who were to wade ashore with the Marines from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. Thus to the fourth estate came a new type of reporter—a man who was to be a marine first, a newspaperman second.

The idea of the combat correspondent was not new with the Marine Corps, although it was new to the military of America. Long ago both Russia and Germany had "writer-fighters." These countries used the "writer-fighters" not primarily for the coverage of the war, but rather for the effect of their writings on the morale of the troops. The reasoning behind the "writer-fighter" was soundly based on a fundamental knowledge of human nature. If a soldier was aware that his family and friends back home were cognizant of his personal part in the war, his morale was substantially boosted.

Such was the reasoning of the instigators behind the creation of the Marine combat correspondent, and the agency of which he was field representative—the Division of Public Relations.

In addition to the morale factor, there was another motive in establishing the program of which the combat correspondent was a part. This was a feeling of obligation to the American public. It was obvious from the outset of war that the civilian correspondent could not alone produce the volume of copy demanded by the public. War correspondents did a superb job of covering the war, but they were few in number and limited by the nature of their assignments to the larger aspects of the war.

The people of America were hungry for personal news about their men overseas. The terse communiques that came out of battle gave only a brief over-all picture of the action. The combat correspondent's stories were designed to put meat on the skeleton. To him fell the job of writing the graphic report of the grim, tired, dirty men who fought and died for some obscure speck of land in a great ocean far from home. He wrote of war as a personal thing. He wrote of what the men thought the night before they went into battle, what they did, what they ate, and where they slept. He didn't make many first page headlines, but he wasn't supposed to. His was the job of recording the war through the eyes of the kid who lived next door.

With all due respect to the late Ernie Pyle, whose war writings have earned for him an undying place in the hearts of America, the writer in Marine dungarees was telling the story of "the little guy's war" when Halfaya Pass was only a notch in an African mountain range, and Anzio was a small seacoast town in Italy.

The task of the combat correspondent was clearly outlined. How he accomplished his mission was, more or less, left to his own initiative. His purpose in the Marine Corps was defined to include three accomplishments. First, he was to be a marine and do general marine duties. Second, he was to collect military information and facts of historical value to the Marine Corps. And finally, he was to collect, prepare, and forward for publication news items and articles of interest to the American public.

These were the orders to the men who were to pack their typewriters and rifles ashore on the white sands of Tarawa and the shifting ashes of Iwo Jima. Headline writing was left to the war correspondents who represented the large news-

The Marine Corps scored another first with the introduction of two new kinds

Fourth Estate

papers and wire services. The combat correspondent covered the war as an integral part of it, a job he was well-equipped to do. He understood the marines, because he was a marine himself. He could translate their slang into English, and evolve some manner of sense out of the mumbo-jumbo officialese of orders and directives. He understood the strange affiliation of the various units of a regiment or division with the echelons to which they were related. He was briefed before an operation. He knew the plans and tactics to be employed. This knowledge was a distinct advantage to him in laying his own plans to cover the engagement from the best vantage point.

But perhaps we are getting a little ahead of our story. It was some time before the combat correspondent was invited to attend the staff meetings and briefings that proceeded an operation. For the men who went into the field to lay the ground work, for what was later to be credited as the best public relations organization of all military services, it was often a heartbreaking job. They were beset by red tape, unwarranted censorship, and iron-clad rules of deportment from every side.

Most COs greeted them with, "A combat correspondent! What in hell is that?"

When they were informed what the purpose of a correspondent was, they usually shook their heads and snorted, "Damndest thing I ever heard of!"

Some COs were more reasonable and gave them a helping hand, but for most of them the first few months was a rough tour of duty. The word they most often heard was an explosive, emphatic "No!" General opinion seemed to be that correspondents were nothing but nuisances and the command would be much better off if the "typewriter pounders" turned up among the missing some morning at reveille roll call.

The difficulties with which they were continually faced was aptly expressed by one correspondent who used to tell his men:

"You can't beat the censor.
"You can't beat the war correspondent.
"You can't beat your brains out!"

Many times the first sergeant found chores other than pounding a portable typewriter for them to do. Some lay claim to more time on the head detail than any other marine in the Corps. First sergeants loved to pick on the boys whom they were inclined to think were fighting the war the easy way.

Not all their trouble came from such sources, however. Tojo's warriors contributed their share to the general discomfiture, and many of their troubles stemmed from the calamities that befell the tools of their trade. An enemy mortar shell did horrible things to a portable "mill." Some, of course, went the way of the deep six, or became irreparably fouled by coral sand. Many a story was written on the back of an envelope or a piece of scrap paper.

And so it went. Public Relations personnel battled the Japs, the elements, and in between times, battled with the old man for recognition as *bona fide* members of his command. Many of them risked courts-martial to do what they had been sent out to do. Many took unnecessary risks to get their stories to prove that they were made of the same stuff as other marines.

Perhaps one of the most unusual of all is the story of one of the best photographers ever to wear the uniform. At the present, ex-1stLt David Duncan is roving the Near East on an assignment for LIFE magazine. The story of his life reads like a consolidation of the Adventures of Frank Merriwell and the Rover Boys. It is an accepted fact that he will do anything to get a picture.

While a Public Relations officer he was attached to a Marine Air Wing in the Pacific. The rocket was just coming into its own as armament for planes. Because of the nature of the rocket and the manner by which it was fired from a plane it was rather difficult to get good pictures of the rockets in flight. The PRO decided the best way to get good action shots of rocket strafing runs was to take the pictures from the underside of the plane while it was making its pass at the target. How to go about obtaining such pictures provoked a good deal of thought. Finally arriving at a solution, he went

of military journalists — Public Relations men and combat correspondents



In a poncho-shaded foxhole on Roi-Namur, Marine writer David Dempsey grinds out a story on his portable "mill."

into a long conference with the chief mechanic of a squadron of Army P-38s stationed at the same field. Posterity has recorded that the chief mechanic after the session gazed at Duncan's retreating back and muttered aloud, "That man's got holes in his head!"

Following several days of intense activity in the rear of the workshop, a strange looking object was unveiled for public view. Close inspection proved that it was a P-38 belly-tank with its metal nose replaced by plexiglass.

Since aviators are notoriously daft, Duncan had little trouble in finding a pilot to fly a plane with the aerial observation post attached. An elaborate system was devised whereby the occupant could release the belly-tank in flight, then pull a steel cable which would cause the tank to fall apart in mid-air, allowing him to fall free to use his parachute. At least, that was the theory.

The maiden flight lasted two hours, the net results being: no pictures, the loss of ten pounds by the photographer, and the firm conviction that the engineering research on the project had been anything but complete.

The inventors had failed to take into consideration that a human body enclosed in a small space without benefit of ventilation, will generate a tremendous amount of heat, especially with the outside temperature hovering around 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Consequently, the plexiglass nose and camera lenses had become so fogged with moisture as to become useless.

To combat this condition, a series of vents were cut in the tank. The second flight, and the two that followed, produced much more satisfying results—some of the best action shots of the war, and the Distinguished Flying Cross for the photographer.

On an airfield in the Pacific a Public Relations officer and two photographers were busily engaged in taking pictures of a two-star general pinning Air Medals on the recipients at a decoration ceremony. The photographers were not getting the kind of pictures they wanted because the general always had his arm or hand in the line of sight as he placed the medal upon a chest. As the general moved to attach the third medal, the PRO stepped forward and interrupted the general.

"General, we'd get a much better picture if you stood a little to the left and didn't cover the medal with your hand."

A pregnant silence greeted his remarks. Two staff colonels evidenced violent signs of apoplexy and the general's aide could be heard gasping for breath. It was common gossip that the general ate second lieutenants for breakfast, washing them down with ample draughts of flame-thrower fuel.

The general, taken by surprise, stepped back to survey in ominious silence the officer who had addressed him.

"By God, son, do you know that I've been pinning on medals for 15 years?"

"Yes, sir," the lieutenant answered.

"And you don't think I do it right, eh?" the general bellowed.

"No, sir, not right for us to get good pictures."

"All right, son," the general replied, "show me how you want it done. Any second lieutenant that can show me how after I've been doing it for 15 years must know what he is doing!"

From that day on the general refused to start a decoration ceremony until he was sure his public relations people were in the right position to get the pictures they wanted. The general had been sold.

By the time the war against Japan began to roll toward its inevitable end, the combat correspondent and the Public Relations officer were well-established institutions.

The success they enjoyed is perhaps best at-

tested by a statement once made by an Army Public Relations officer upon addressing a group of civilian newsmen.

"In the Army a squad consists of thirteen men. In the Marine Corps it consists of twelve men and a press agent."

This may be put down as good natured exaggeration as there were never more than 15 combat correspondents to a Marine division.

The task of the combat correspondent, that of discovering and writing the story, was only the first step in the long journey to its final destination—public print. Behind the story that appeared in the local newspaper of "Joe Blow's" home town was a well-organized system of collection, transmittal, and distribution. This system was designed to guarantee full coverage of all civilian news outlets. Well-tested by time and the flood of war copy, it proved successful both in economy of personnel and cost of operation.

Briefly, it worked in the following manner.

The actual writing of a news story was of course, done in the field, by one of the correspondents attached to field units. Upon completion it was turned over to the central collection agency in that particular unit or area. The PRO checked the story and forwarded it to one of two places, the Director's office in Washington, or the Assistant Director's office in San Francisco, depending upon whether the story's ultimate destination was the eastern or the western part of the U.S.

After the story was received in one of the two offices, it was edited in the same manner of copy for any newspaper. At the same time it was labeled for the proper geographical section of the country, or for some particular publication whose requirements the story best seemed to fit.

It was then sent to the section of the country to which the interest in the story was most evident. For instance, a story concerning a local son of Jawbone, Montana, would have not interest to the citizenry of Clearwater, Florida, and was therefore aimed at publication in the Jawbone Journal.

Since the United States was already divided into six recruiting divisions, these agencies were utilized as distribution points for news copy. A Public Relations officer was attached to the staff of the officer-in-charge of each recruiting division. His purposes being two-fold, to act as a Public Relations officer and to assist in whatever way possible with recruiting.

In turn, each recruiting division was divided into a number of recruiting districts. In each of these recruiting districts an NCO was the direct contact with the media of his particular locality.

Survivor of two days behind Jap lines on Bougainville, GySgt Wm. Evans relates his odyssey to correspondent Charles Evans.

Stories are where you find them. Combat Correspondent Leodel Coleman gets one from PISgt R. F. Luttrell on how the Japs made liquor from coconuts on Bougainville.

Following our story which was written in the field and forwarded to the West Coast for distribution, it was labeled for the western recruiting division, which includes the state of Montana. The PRO in the division in turn, forwarded it to his NCO who was located nearest to the town of Jawbone. Upon this NCO fell the responsibility of seeing that the news copy was brought to the attention of the editor of the Jawbone Journal.

During the war the main business of the Division of Public Relations was the supplying of news copy to the media of the country. But the end of war found a radical change in the reading habits of the country. As far as publishers are concerned the war is dead, as dead as yesterday's headlines.

The Marine Corps began its reconversion to a peacetime establishment. The reserves began to go back to their civilian occupations, the material of war was stored in warehouses and once again there was talk of dress blues and guard duty. Along with the rest of the Corps, the Division of Public Relations began its reconversion.

The first step was to change its official name from Public Relations to Public Information. The combat correspondents dropped the "combat" to become Marine Corps Correspondents, and turned their attention to writing about subjects which did not have a war background.

With the war over, many felt that the job of the Division of Public Information had served its purpose and should be retired to inactive duty along with certain other war expedients. The die-hards who had accepted it merely as a necessary evil began to ask the same old questions: "Why is Public Information necessary? Why can't we run our Marine Corps the way we want to and the public be damned?"

The answers, of course, are the same in peace as they were in war. Oddly enough the Marine Corps belongs to the public. And to them the Marine Corps owes a certain responsibility. In peace, as in war, the American people are still interested in the individual, in what he eats, what he wears and what he does.

On the wall of the Director's office in Headquarters there hangs a framed motto which warns in fine old script, "*If the Public becomes apathetic about the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps will cease to exist.*"

The task of the Division of Public Information then, is to be the link between the Marine Corps and the American public. As such its job is to have cognizance of all matters of public interest which have to do with the Marine Corps. To this end the various sections of the Division in Headquarters are devoted to all phases of public contact ranging from radio and newspapers to the business of answering hundreds of personal letters each week. The subjects with which this

agency comes in contact are indeed of wide variety. They range from such things as the official answer to an irate parent's demand that son Johnnie be sent home immediately from China to attend the first reunion of his high school graduating class, to a request for the paw prints of the official Marine mascot for someone who is collecting autographs of famous personalities in World War II.

No request is too bizarre, none too ridiculous, since the majority of them are sent in good faith and expect an answer. And although some of them provoke many a chuckle of amusement they are answered if it is humanly possible. One letter which is a classic by any Marine standards is the following, written by an ex-marine:

"Dear Sir:

"I am doing my utmost to uphold the standards of the Marine Corps, but there is an Army officer living next door to me. He constantly quotes statistics of which I am unable to answer. Please give me something to work on and I will plug the Corps to the end. Please hurry.

"Sincerely,
(signature)"

"P.S. Please give me instructions as to how to treat this dope."

Needless to say the ex-marine was furnished with the necessary statistics, although the proper manner in which to treat his adversary was left to the judgment of the writer.

Still other sections of the Division are devoted to maintaining a liaison with various veterans organizations, and working with them on such projects as concern the Marine Corps. Another is occupied with the production and distribution of radio shows and spot announcements in connection with the Marine Corps' recruiting program. Still another is charged with the responsibility of arranging for speakers to appear before the public and various organizations throughout the country. More often than not this section also has to write the speech in addition to arranging for the appearance of the speaker.

The province of Public Information also includes the review of all material written for publication by Marine Corps personnel. And although the day of military security is, for the most part, a thing of the past, such writings must still be checked for policy and good taste.

In short, every phase of the Marine Corps in which the public is interested, falls within the scope of Public Information. That it will continue to be of value in the peacetime establishment is as assured as the acceptance by the people of America of a philosophy that finds its manifestations in planned public relations.

But, the carefully integrated plans of a long-range program notwithstanding, a snappily-dressed, shiny-shoed marine walking down the street is still the best public relations the Marine Corps will ever have. USMC

Claims for Ex-POWs

AT THE request of the Casualty Division, the following information is printed for the benefit of all former POWs:

After World War I it was found that many members of the Armed Forces of the United States as well as certain civilians had valid claims against our former enemies for physical injuries and/or death suffered at the hands of the enemy. In due time these claims were placed with the State Department, which is the only agency of the United States Government authorized to prosecute such claims. The State Department, after verifying the authenticity of such claims, obtained settlements from the enemy or its funds in the custody of the United States. This service was performed at no cost to the individual claimants.

Plans are now going forward to extend a similar service to all former prisoners of war or their next of kin in World War II who may have claims against the enemy. Detailed procedure are now being studied and will be published when completed. No agency in the United States except the State Department has any authority to present such claims against the enemy and the claimants will not be required to pay any fee or charge of any kind to the State Department for prosecuting such claims. All former prisoners of war, or the next of kin of prisoners of war who died in enemy hands, who feel that they have just claims against the enemy for damages, should forward affidavits setting forth the details of the claims to the Claims Section (Prisoners of War Claims), Office of the Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, Washington 25, D. C.

To the Editor

With this issue the GAZETTE reinstates its letters to the editor column with the confident belief that this should be one of the magazine's strongest features. The GAZETTE wants its readers to use these pages not only for comments and corrections on past articles, but also as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. This does not mark the institution of a "gripe" column, wherein an individual can snipe at existing rules and regulations not to his particular liking. What is wanted are contributions designed to promote discussion on topics of professional importance to Marine Corps policy and thought. Correspondents should include their name, rank, and address, but we will withhold the signature if so requested.

Officers' Privileges . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have just read "The Case Against The Critics" by Agnes T. Hirshinger, in the July issue of the GAZETTE, and I feel that there is another side to the matter, as there is to all controversial subjects. I heartily agree with the gist of Miss Hirshinger's article, but I would like to take her to task for some of the examples she uses.

For four years I was an enlisted man in the Marine Corps and I am proud of it. I have traveled extensively in the East since my discharge and at no time have I ever heard it even hinted that a marine is a downtrodden, under-privileged victim of an undemocratic military system. Unless Miss Hirshinger was subjected to some real high-pressuring, I am at a loss as to how she arrived at that conclusion. I think that the solution to that problem would work itself right into view if we all thought of ourselves as ex-marines first, and veterans in the general sense, second.

However, I do feel that the Marine Corps system can be improved, perhaps radically from a professional standpoint, but improved nevertheless.

I, too, worked prior to my enlistment, and I feel that Miss Hirshinger has drawn a rather remarkable comparison in likening the business world to the Marine Corps. Never in my years of civilian employment have I known of a successful corporation that based its promotions solely on years of service. The hundreds of 25-year night-watchmen, clerks, and janitors belie such a contention. I know that technically such is not the case in the Marine Corps either, but let's not kid ourselves about that. It is particularly true of the commissioned ranks. An officer with a record, as long as it's not bad or even poor, will be promoted with his class. A lesser, though outstanding, officer must wait his turn. I fully realize that this is a matter that should not be discussed outside of the BOQ, but I feel that the standing setup is incorrect, inasmuch as it minimizes merit and places a premium on inactivity for surely an inactive officer cannot make mistakes.

Miss Hirshinger's comparison of the social aspects are again remarkable. Far be it from me to foist myself upon the commissioned personnel by forcing them to admit me to their clubs. However, as a civilized individual I have often found galling the fact that I could not enjoy a cocktail and dinner without going to considerable trouble and travel. While stationed in Quantico a trip to Washington was necessary before such a minor comfort could be enjoyed, though the commissioned personnel enjoyed it on post. I am not attacking said privilege as an evidence of an existing caste system. Rather, as a social and recreational shortcoming that should be remedied. No one realizes the terrific possibilities of such an undertaking. Many times overseas, I tried to rationalize the irrational viewpoint, held by some men, that all hands should receive a liquor ration. But, now, and in the States, in particular, I think that small enlisted clubs, patterned after the officers' clubs, could be successfully managed by dependable personnel.

In discussing the privileges of rank, and rank's accompanying responsibility, Miss Hirshinger omits discussion of one of the Marine Corps all too popular practices: that of giving a man acting higher rank than he holds. I know of no place in the Marine Corps that a corporal, acting platoon sergeant, can enjoy the privileges of the Staff NCO mess, or the platoon sergeant's pay. But he certainly assumes the platoon sergeant's responsibilities, and, furthermore, is powerless to refuse the duty with its accompanying discriminations. I am sure that that problem can be remedied by minimizing transfers and by rating according to the T/O.

Abuses by individuals, of the privileges under discussion, should be handled by the Marine Corps with no outside interference. Such a policy should accompany the advent of peacetime routine. Wartime excuses are no longer applicable.

I do not pretend to know all the cures for the Marine Corps' ills, but I do feel that many improvements could be suggested by a research group, dominated by neither military nor civilian thinking.

If the Marine Corps is to win its present battle for existence, I feel that such steps must be taken. The Marine Corps cannot remain tradition-bound during a progressive military trend.

Sincerely yours,

JACK T. SAYERS,
(ex) 360116, USMC.

ED: One of the inequities cited by Mr Sayers, that of hard liquor privileges, is at least partially remedied by a new SecNav directive which permits enlisted men to have liquor in their overseas clubs and recreation rooms. Qualification is that wherever there is a bar there must also be a soda fountain open during the same hours. Also, sale of liquor to minors is taboo.

Mistaken Identity . . .

DEAR SIR:

We all make mistakes; here's a couple you made. Are these Corsairs? Page 9, 14, July edition.

C. A. MANN,
Captain, USMCR.

ED: Apologies to Capt Mann and all the other birdmen who have told us about our earthbound editor's obvious error; they were Curtiss Hell Divers (SB2Cs). Is that right?

Whoops, Wrong Sex . . .

DEAR SIR:

I received your letter informing me that my subscription has expired. Am enclosing check for $3.00 to renew my subscription—under one condition, however. The condition is that you correct an injustice done to me for nigh on to two years, to wit: that the correct designation "USMCR" is used following my name, instead of the present and incorrect "MCWR." In other words I am a man, not, I repeat, not a woman; a male officer, not, I repeat, not a female officer. I have tried to correct this several times in the past to no avail. And I'm betting that the next GAZETTE I receive will be no different. How about it?

Not incidentally, I think the GAZETTE is a really first-class publication. From cover-to-cover I find much good dope and reading enjoyment.

Yours for bigger and better GAZETTE and Association, and a correction of the above if you please.

NAME WITHHELD.

ED: Our addressograph operator should have his wrist slapped for making such a mistake.

Satisfied Customer . . .

DEAR SIR:

. . . You bet I want to renew my subscription to the Marine Corps GAZETTE as it is one of the best edited and interesting professional magazines that we get—my family enjoys it also and, in my opinion, that speaks volumes.

I have been hospitalized for the past year. While at Lejeune I received the GAZETTE at quarters. When I was transferred to Bethesda had the magazine sent home and always got a copy from the Grey Ladies at Bethesda.

Thanks again and all good wishes for continued success.

Cordially,

J. L. MURPHY,
Major, USMC.

ED: Thanks for the kind words, Major.

Wrong barracks . . .

GENTLEMEN:

In your July issue PFC R. L. Klaus stated that the "Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C., is the only team to take this trophy (Elliot) and the Wirgman Trophy in one year."

Please correct the statement to read "Marine Barracks, Navy Yard, D. C." The year was 1940.

J. R. LIRETTE,
LtCol, USMC.

ED: Our usually accurate Klaus is not the first to confuse the two Washington Marine Barracks.

Culebra, Cuba . . .

DEAR SIR:

I wish to call your attention to a photograph appearing on page 44 of the August GAZETTE in illustration of Holland Smith's article on "Amphibious Tactics." The caption reads, "1924—On annual fleet maneuvers, U .S. Marines swam ashore at Culebra, Cuba." I submit that Culebra is not in Cuba and that marines certainly in the picture were not swimming ashore, nor would it be a sensible thing to do so all loaded down for a landing attack. I do not know whose responsibility it is to edit these things, but certainly someone with a little more knowledge of both tactics and geography should overhaul these efforts, lest we be made ridiculous in the eyes of the other services.

P. A. DEL VALLE,
Major General, USMC.

ED: "Swam" was a typographical error; it should have been "swarm." Culebra is the smaller of two islands lying in the Virgin Passage immediately east of Porto Rico. It was selected as a naval station in 1902.

military digest

A monthly digest of important articles from leading military periodicals

—september index—

GUIDED MISSILES ARE COMING, *LtCol William R. Kintner*..... 56

OVERSEAS WAR IN 1846, *Lt Ivor Spencer*.... 58

Guided Missiles Are Coming

By LtCol William R. Kintner

IT IS only proper for military men to take stock of their profession after a war. Tactics, weapons, organization, and doctrine all must come under the scrutiny of critical review to determine the sound designs or concepts which will insure our nation's future military security. The last war introduced new weapons whose capabilities have caused consideration to be given to making changes in the very basic structure of our defense system itself.

The atomic bomb is in the forefront of these weapons. Its terrifying impact on the human mind is such as to obscure certain other developments whose effect on the art of war may prove as profound. Basically, the atomic bomb is an explosive medium more lethal than anything ever imagined. However, in spite of its earth-shattering power, the offense must still devise ways of getting the atomic explosive to the target. Likewise, the historical requirements of the defense continue although its execution grows more complex. Psychologically, the defense will be forced to drop the *laissez faire* attitude of the football lineman, who can let an occasional ball carrier slide through and instead, accept the final responsibility of the quarterback, who must stop them all.

Into this historical offense-defense struggle has been introduced a weapon which may reshuffle the technique of warfare more than the atomic bomb—the guided missile. The eventual development of the guided missile into a proven weapon will have a tremendous effect on airplanes, artillery and most important of all, on the relation of all types of surface forces to aerial forces.

Popular fancy envisions development of some mammoth rocket whose single atomic explosion will wipe out entire cities. Although this may be, unfortunately, the final outcome, common sense dictates the evolution of intermediate types, each tailor-made for a particular job.

What design details must be considered in the various models of guided missiles? The essential tactical elements are: size, fuzing, speed, duration of flight, control and method of launching. Upon the missiles' size will depend the explosive force. The size must vary according to the weapons' use. Existing proximity fuzes will meet the likely needs of ground-to-air defensive missiles as well as many types of ground-to-ground projectiles, but further fuze development may be necessary for some rocket uses.

There should be wide variation in the speed of these missiles. This factor is closely related to control; for certain uses we may desire visual selection of targets and direction of missiles which will require that they fly slowly enough to be seen. Duration of flight will depend upon

the type of propulsion used. It will determine the range of use as well as the manner of use. Development here is concerned with mechanics —of propulsion and fuel research, upon both of which ultimately depend over-all efficiency and economic feasibility of the weapon. Control has several aspects. These are predetermined course, positive control from launching or forward pickup stations and homing control in which the hapless target determines its own destruction. Combinations of types of control might be desirable. Launching arrangements will largely determine the mobility of the weapon and will differ greatly between close and strategical support weapons. Fuel for mobile close-support weapons must be made insensitive to handling.

To destroy the high-flying bombers, several types of guided missiles could be employed. Against small-scale attacks a projectile capable of individual direction against an individual bomber, should be used. Such a projectile should have a strong explosive charge fired by a VT fuze at close range. The guided missile should travel at supersonic speeds and be capable of sustained flight for the entire period of interception. The complete projectile should be crew serviced and should be fired by a launcher towed by a conventional truck. It should be exploded by a self-destroying fuze when its fuel supply is exhausted. It will be fired toward the roughly predicted position of the target. The target will be radar tracked. This missile will be radar controlled from the ground. It may be desirable to employ a homing device to the missile to become operative within close range of the target. This type of missile would defend small-area vital objectives in a manner equivalent to present AA gun battalions.

Against large-scale high-altitude bombing attacks, another variation in guided missiles should prove to be successful. Basically, the answer to the mass-attack defense problem is to saturate the air volume through which the flying armada passes, with enough explosive to destroy a decisive proportion of the formation. This guided missile should be capable of setting off an appropriate atomic explosion in the target area. The explosive would be fired by a proximity fuze. These projectiles should be capable of being fired in great numbers. Upon reaching the target area each projectile would initiate a search. Homing radar may be used in conjunction with this search system. The missile should be capable of long-range interceptions. It should have a high approach speed and a lower speed during search.

Launching sites would be set up at wide intervals throughout the defended zone. The duration of flight should be several minutes. The complete missile should not have excessive weight. This missile will be radar-directed from the ground to a point above the center of the bomber formation where it will begin to execute an expanding spiral downwards until the proximity fuze is exploded. Launching installations would be static, hence their weight would be immaterial. Present warning service, if refined and improved, would be adequate for this type of missile although adequate communications and control tactics at launching sites would have to be developed.

Concurrently with the evolution of guided ground-to-air missiles we must plan for the offensive employment of ground-to-ground missiles and the defense against them. The advance of technology has already opened the race for supremacy in this field.

What are the prospects of using guided missiles in place of present Field and Coast Artillery? Ultimately, it is the opinion of the writer. they are quite good. In Coast Artillery, the combination of great range, along with launching guidance and homing control would prohibit enemy naval operations comparable to our own fleet's recent strikes off the Japanese shore. The advantages of greater flexibility, ease in massing fires over wide sectors of the front and the elimination of costly, cumbersome rifled guns all indicate substitution of guided missiles for present Field Artillery. The dramatic power of rocket projectiles displayed in the recent war indicates how effective they might be, once proper fire control is achieved. For this type of employment the launcher must be highly mobile. Ranges throughout the battle zone would be acceptable.

Missiles should have devastating explosive charges. Fuzes should be either VT or delayed action. Predetermined, set course control will probably be satisfactory for most missions.

Fantastic, destructive long range rockets have come closer to achieving operational success in this last war than any other type of guided missile discussed. The ground has already been pioneered to produce the most destructive weapon ever made. This weapon is likewise, due to its inherent speed and altitude, the most difficult to defend against. Offensively its characteristics are fairly apparent. It will have a vast range, an impact error probably of a few miles, an atomic warhead, speed of from 3,000 to 4,000 miles per hour and a high payload in relation to projectile weight.

Both the employment of this super rocket and the organization of the defenses against it will be on a continental scale. Warning radar will have to be greatly refined in range, sensitivity and ability to discriminate between targets. Warning stations and launching sites will have

continental dispersion. Elaborate and positive communications will hook all sites into central control rooms. Interception missiles will have to be launched toward actual intercept points. Electronic calculators will have to be designed to instantaneously select the priority targets in mass attacks and to allocate defense to most effective launching sites.

It is believed that certain general postulates can be made. The first is that the successful development of guided missiles may mean the eventual elimination of the present type of air force. Obviously there would be no need to send a piloted aircraft to do the same job that a rocket could accomplish without risk of life. Air force interception of supersonic projectiles is practically out of the question, for even if a suitable plane could be developed it is not likely that human responses would be rapid enough for interception. Nor is it likely that the human body could withstand the associated accelerations. This leads to another premise equally apparent, namely, that the agency responsible for the offensive development and use of guided missiles must closely coordinate its program with the agency charged with the defense against them.

At the present time Antiaircraft Artillery is charged with determination of military characteristics and is assisting the Ordnance Department in the development of ground-to-air missiles whose sustenance in flight depends primarily upon momentum. The foregoing discussion of the capabilities of guided missiles and the effect their development will have on current weapons is pure speculation. This speculation is based on existing technical discoveries and the astonishingly accelerated application of science to weapons. It is important to consider that all these weapons may come to pass. The imminent possibility of the arrival of guided missiles must influence all military planning especially in relation to aerial warfare. The proved guided missle may render the piloted aircraft impotent in either defensive or offensive warfare. It is possible that the piloted aircraft may find itself relegated, at best, to an exclusive role of troop carrier, reconnaissance and photographic missions. ★

Overseas War—In 1846!

By Lt Ivor Spencer

THE castle could not be taken by frontal assault, declared Winfield Scott, our general-in-chief. It would be necessary to land upon the beaches below the city. We should need 140 surf boats, capable of putting ashore 5,000 men in the first minutes. Once upon the ground, our troops could invest the city from the rear. The castle of San Juan de Ulua, one of the hemisphere's strongest fortress could be taken later. For this great "combined operation," a huge convoy of not less than 50 good-sized vessels would be needed, carrying siege guns, shells and rockets, supplies of every sort, wagons, horses for the dragoons and "light" (field) artillery, and the initial army of 14,000 to be strengthened later. When city and castle had been taken, a direct advance could be made upon the capital, forcing the enemy to his knees.

So ran MajGen Scott's memoranda of a plan of operations, submitted to the Secretary of War in October and November 1846. Its surprisingly modern features depict the greatest single operation of our war of 1846 to 1848 with the republic of Mexico. Gen Zachary Taylor, after defeating the enemy in two pitched battles, just east of the "Rio Grande del Norte" near its mouth, had lately occupied Monterey, roughly 200 miles westward, after three days of costly fighting. Further advance from this quarter, across the near-desert country towards San Luis de Potosi, was scarcely possible. "Old Zach" admitted it himself. Hence came the new movement, as outlined in Scott's memoranda and already virtually decided upon by President Polk and his admirers. It would be the most sweeping military enterprise that the country had ever seen.

The fact is that the Mexican War, although fought with the rather limited and old-fashioned materiel of a century ago, posed many of the problems of the present war. Hard as it is to realize, this was our first overseas struggle. Unlike the contests that had begun in 1775 and 1812, it was fought upon foreign territory, and at a great distance as well. Messages from the seat of government and supplies from our northeastern manufacturing towns had to travel 2,000 miles even to get to the Rio Grande area. Nor does one play upon words in calling it an "overseas" war. Men and supplies alike, for the campaigns in northern and central Mexico, were

MILITARY AFFAIRS, Winter 1945

carried by water. Shipping had to be provided not only for crossing the Gulf and skirting our eastern coast, but also for transit around Cape Horn to California.

As on the eve of World War II, our army in 1846 was distressingly small. It was also, to today's layman somewhat overwhelmed by the specialization of 1944, rather charmingly lacking in complexity. With men hardened by long service on the Indian frontiers, and with officers trained at "the Point," the 1846 army was an efficient little outfit. Yet there were only 14 regiments in all, and these did not come up to the legal *maximum* of 42 privates per company. There were only four batteries of field artillery, although these men had the skill that comes from ample target practice.

The army had neither signal corps nor intelligence section, and the quartermaster and engineer officers had no enlisted men under them. Serious as was the absence of quartermaster companies, it was the lack of "sappers, miners, and pontoniers," or, to use our simpler term, "engineers," that the army particularly held against an over-thrifty congress. Indeed, Gen Taylor afterward tried to blame upon this factor his failure completely to destroy the enemy after his victories east of the Rio Grande. After hostilities began, our armed forces were raised from about 8,000 men to some 50 or 60 thousand, unfortunately chiefly by forming volunteer units led by officers of their own choosing. A particularly serious blunder lay in the setting of a 12-months' term for the first 50,000 of these volunteers, which in practice meant that commanders at times had to release men badly needed. All in all, the volunteers did better than the regulars were willing to admit. At Buena Vista, for example, although the volunteer companies did sometimes break and run in a manner reminiscent of the Bladensburg "races" of 1814, it was a preponderantly volunteer army that, outnumbered four to one, beat Santa Anna's great host. The other chief change made in the army was the establishment of an engineer company.

In 1846, the great changes in military technology that the next hundred years were to bring happily lay beyond the threshold. Utterly unmechanized, our forces advanced by muscle power, the muscle of men, mule and horse. The blue-clad troops plodded on afoot into the arid Mexican highlands, bragging their dream of an early revel in the Halls of Montezuma. Behind, long trains of wagons and pack mules carried the bacon ("side pieces or middlings," Scott had said) and hard bread and all of the other necessaries. Despatches, written *en clair* rather than in code, were carried by mounted courier. On the sea, our vessels were mainly sailing ships.

Flintlock muskets were the rule, rather than rifles, and the celebrated, new "repeating firearms" or "revolvers" of Samuel Colt were carried only by the cavalry (and not by the dragoons). Late in 1846 the War Department was trying to purchase the right to make "Colt's" in our arsenals, and was finding the inventor a hard bargainer. The new German explosive, gun-cotton, was just being tested by our ordnance officers. It was the same with communications. Railways, veteran carriers of some 15 or 16 years' standing, had no real part in this war. The little line that connected Vera Cruz and Jalapa, for example, played no part in Scott's advance. Presumably it had been stripped of rolling stock. The electric telegraph had been in operation in the United States for two years, and was rapidly being extended along the eastern seaboard in the war years. It was not until well into 1848, however, that New Orleans was connected with the East. Important tidings from the battlefront were rushed towards Washington by an impromptu pony express. Military employment of photography was, of course, still more remote. A few daguerreotypes were taken of our troops in Mexico, for souvenir purposes only, and one participant, Capt Robert Anderson, later the defender of Fort Sumter in 1861, remarked in one of his nightly letters to his wife his regret that he did not have "a good daguerreotype apparatus" with which to picture the country for her.

Aside from these foreshadowings of change, there were a few instances of the actual application of new technology. Among our vessels in the Gulf, for example, there were not only paddle-wheel steamers but also "propellers." And most interesting was the use of rubber pontoons for military bridges. Trains of well-designed rubber pontoons were hastily manufactured and rushed to the field for use by the new engineer company.

The United States entered its Mexican War, as it has many other, not only unprepared but also ignorant of the need to prepare. Winfield Scott, distinguished and cosmopolitan soldier that he was, understood both the need and the ignorance. He was courageous enough to tell Secretary of War Marcy that a good four months would be required to enlist, train, equip, and transport the men for a real offensive. The administration was horrified. So too was the public, when the news of Scott's attitude began to leak out. Scott was dubbed a dotard, and people expected that Taylor would be at Mexico City within a few weeks—certainly by the Fourth of July! Polk and Marcy, able as they were, were inclined to take the popular view. ★

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

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

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Tarawa Today

Continued from the back cover

were in it have been buried. Farther up the beach stand four 3-in. Jap guns—the last of many which dotted that stubborn and deadly fortification. And all around are bigger weapons—the 8-in. coast defense guns which Navy bombardment and dive bombers knocked out before the landings.

The Japs' coconut-log pillboxes, the cruelest enemy of all, have rotted and washed away. Once they stood at 10- to 15-foot intervals all along the shore line—death traps of green logs covered with sand, harder to breach than concrete, each holding a machine gun. The pillboxes were impervious to offshore shelling; they were captured only when men on foot sought them out with flamethrowers and grenades; now tropical rain and heat have obliterated all traces.

The American population of Betio today is 57 outpost soldiers, two civilian weathermen and a lone sailor who mans the LCT moored at the new concrete pier. In addition there are four British colonial officers, one of whom has brought his wife and daughter to Betio, and the families of 73 native men who work for the troops at the standard wage rate of $11.46 a month (soon to be increased to $14 because even Tarawa shows signs of inflation). All live comfortably and unbusily in *fales*, which are frame huts built by now-departed Seabees and thatched by the natives. (While I was on Betio this time I slept soundly in a *fale* close by the spot where I had once spent a night in a foxhole.) Yet the living population, about 400 in all, seems somehow overshadowed and subdued by the ghosts of the 5,000 men—1,000 marines and 4,000 Japs—who died and were buried there, on an island which is only two miles long and never more than a half mile wide. The signs of death are everywhere. A half dozen bleached human bones lie unnoticed on the ground outside the shower in the officers' area. A mess sergeant, planting a young palm outside his door, had dug only a few inches before he found the leg, foot and hip bone of two men.

As the object of a pilgrimage—a battlefield to be revisited in tribute to the men who died there and to a victory which was one of the most costly and inspiring in our military history—Tarawa is a bitter disappointment. The marines who made its history and hallowed its ground either died on the spot or left a few days later, never to return. They have been succeeded by a series of new generations of Army and Navy personnel; in the rapid turnover of population Tarawa's tradition has been forgotten. The soldiers living there now, on a boring and lonely tour of duty amid the relics of battle and the bleached bones, are only dimly aware of what Tarawa once meant to the hopes of man.

A few efforts have been made to do Tarawa's history justice. The Navy has put up markers, like one on a wrecked Jap storehouse which reads: PUT OUT OF ACTION BY A U. S. DESTROYER LYING OFF THE REEF. Other signs credit the battleships *Colorado* and *Tennessee* with bombing various big guns into silence. But, while all this is true as far as it goes, it signally ignores the decisive role of the thousand dead marines.

The crude crosses put up by the marines to mark the burial places of their fallen comrades were replaced by the Navy with neat white markers, and one Navy commander shifted the crosses in the biggest graveyard to line up with the shore. Now the Army has moved the bodies from 37 scattered burial places to a single cemetery. But all this has resulted in great confusion, especially in the case of the graveyard where the crosses were turned without moving the bodies. Today there are only 533 marked graves on Betio, and of these only 265 are listed as identified. The inevitable erosion, of heroes as well as landmarks, has set in. **US MC**

Tarawa Today

The historic battlefield is a neglected island

By Robert Sherrod
TIME and LIFE correspondent

As war correspondent for Time *and* Life, *the author of this report landed with the Marines on Tarawa on November 21, 1943. His book,* Tarawa, *appeared in 1944.*

Tarawa, Gilbert Islands

The rush of events, which once swept tiny Tarawa atoll to fame and a place deep in the hearts of Americans, has passed on. Today Tarawa slumbers in the backwash, an isolated map point well off the beaten path of Pacific travel, visited only once a week by an Army C-47 which flies in a meager cargo of mail and movies. The "red beaches," where 1,000 marines died to open the victorious U. S. drive across the Central Pacific, now are mute and peaceful—long stretches of white coral being slowly eaten away by the sea. The horrible chatter of Japanese machine guns and the cries of the dying have faded into dim memories.

Yet the traveler revisiting Tarawa finds grim reminders of those terrible and glorious 76 hours in the autumn of 1943, when the marines walked calmly through the shallows against machine-gun fire from 500 Jap pillboxes and covered bunkers, and when it seemed for a time as if the invasion would surely fail and the lives would have been lost in vain. From the air today 25 of Tarawa's islands can be seen lush and green against the blue ocean. The 26th, Betio—where the marines landed—is stark, glittering white. The battle cut down most of Betio's thousands of palm trees, and now even freshly planted trees show a reluctance to take root in the shattered soil. Betio is an island of desolation and of unshaded heat.

On the edge of the reef still lies the hulk of a Japanese freighter sunk two months before the invasion. To the men who captured Tarawa, this old wreck was a landmark of special significance. It was at that point that our Higgins boats found they could go no farther and the long, slow wade to shore began, through water spattered by Japanese machine-gun fire. I can remember lying on the beach and watching the reinforcements come in, plodding unswervingly from the edge of the reef. I recall marveling that no one turned back, though on all sides men were dropping and disappearing beneath the water. At that time the distance from shore to freighter looked to be about 700 yards. Now, looking at the battered freighter almost three years after that fateful day, the distance seems even greater—perhaps 1,000 yards or more. Seeing that long stretch of water, the big wade seems impossible in retrospect.

Just offshore from a spot where I slept in a foxhole lies a rusted, broken 32-ton tank. When the tide is in, the surf laps high on its steel sides; at low tide it sticks up from the bare white coral flats like a prehistoric monster. It was on these flats that dozens of marines died and lay stretched prone, always groping forward, in one gallant and futile effort to storm the Japs' sea wall.

Scattered along the beach are the skeletons of amphibious tractors. One of them lies jammed against the remains of the sea wall; this, I remember, was the *Worried Mind,* though its name has long since been obliterated and the six dead marines who

Continued on inside back cover